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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past decade, tuition increased at nearly twice the rate of 
inflation at colleges and universities across the country.  Simultaneously, at 
elite colleges and universities, endowment values doubled, tripled, or even 
quadrupled over the same period.  Harvard University’s endowment was just 
shy of $9.1 billion at the end of the 1996 fiscal year; by 2008, it was over 
$36.5 billion.  As a result of this trend, institutions of higher education have 
experienced burgeoning public criticism for “hoarding” their wealth and for 
failing to spend a greater percentage of their endowments.  In January 2008, 
the United States Senate Finance Committee requested detailed endowment 
information from the 136 American higher education institutions with 
endowments greater than $500 million at the end of the fiscal year closing on 
June 30, 2007. 
This paper examines the determinants of endowment spending rates 
and identifies the characteristics of colleges and universities that are 
associated with spending higher or lower percentages of endowment market 
values.  The analyses include 126 colleges and universities with endowment 
market values greater than $500 million at the end of the fiscal year closing 
on June 30, 2007.  The results suggest that private institutions, institutions 
with lower endowment market values, institutions with higher annual giving, 
institutions with a higher share of expenditures devoted to research, 
institutions with a higher tuition discount rate, and institutions with more 
Pell grant recipients spend a greater percentage of endowment market value.  
The results also suggest that spending policies affect spending rates. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 At the end of the 2008 fiscal year, Harvard University’s endowment 
was greater than $36.5 billion, the largest educational endowment in the 
world.  Harvard’s endowment is also representative of a trend: the richest 
ten percent of the 791 colleges and universities to complete the 2008 
National Association of College and University Business Officers 
(NACUBO) Endowment Study possessed over 72 percent of the total 
endowment assets.  Regardless of size, endowment distributions provide a 
crucial source of income for institutions of higher education.  During the 
2008 fiscal year, the average endowment distribution for the 77 institutions 
with endowment market values greater than one billion was $178 million, 
representing an average annual spending rate of 4.3 percent.  The average 
endowment distribution for the 64 institutions with endowment market 
values between $500 million and one billion was $41 million, representing an 
average annual spending rate of 4.4 percent.  Given that these institutions 
receive generous tax exemptions, recent public scrutiny has prompted some 
to argue that colleges and universities should be forced to spend a minimum 
of five percent from their endowments annually as required for other non-
profit entities. 
 The following analyses attempts to explain the determinants of 
spending rates at the richest colleges and universities.  Prior to World War II, 
the process of determining endowment distributions was relatively simple; 
colleges and universities would spend only current income from endowment 
funds.  After endowment managers largely abandoned this practice during 
the 1960s, determining an appropriate spending rate from endowment funds 
became more complicated.  Colleges and universities developed spending 
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policies to balance competing objectives: providing funds for the present 
while saving funds for the future and ensuring stable endowment 
distributions while maintaining the purchasing power of endowment funds.  
These spending policies dictate the spending rate from endowment funds.   
In Chapter 2, I provide background information on endowments and 
spending policies: the definition of an endowment, the benefits of an 
endowment, the history of spending policies, the purpose of spending 
policies, an explanation of various spending policies, and a literature review.  
In Chapter 3, I consider the effect of eight variables on the spending rate, 
while controlling for time, over the eleven year period from 1996 to 2006.  
The independent variables include the endowment market value, the annual 
giving, the share of expenditures for research, the tuition discount rate, the 
Pell grant award, the average incoming SAT I score, the control of the 
institution, and the spending rule.  In Chapter 4, I attempt to verify the 
results of Chapter 3 with a new source for the spending rate.  I conclude and 
suggest areas of future research in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2:  Endowments and Spending Policies 
A.  Types of Endowments 
In 1939, the New York State Supreme Count defined an endowment 
as “the bestowment of money as a permanent fund, the income of which is 
to be used in the administration of a proposed work.”1  While endowments 
are often considered a single trust, three distinct types of endowment funds 
exist.  True endowments are funds where the donors have stipulated that the 
principal from the endowment must be maintained in perpetuity.  Therefore, 
institutions may only disburse income generated from the endowment 
principle.  Term or “wasting” endowments are similar to true endowments 
with one distinct difference; unlike true endowments, institutions may 
disburse all or part of the principle at a prespecified time or at a prespecified 
rate.  By accepting a true or term endowment, an institution agrees to follow 
any restrictions on investment methods, appreciation expenditures, or uses 
for the endowment distributions.  Quasi-endowments, or funds functioning 
as endowment, are funds that have been set aside at the discretion of an 
institution’s governing board to function as an endowment.  An institution 
may disburse the principle of these funds at any time; because these funds 
are internally designated, the institution does not have any legal obligation to 
preserve the principle of these funds.  Averaging the responses from 791 
institutions for the 2008 endowment study, the National Association of 
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) estimates that 55.5 
percent of endowment assets are true endowments, 32.5 percent are quasi-
endowments, and 6.6 percent are term endowments.  On average, the 
percentage of true endowments is the smallest for the richest institutions, 
                                                 
1 Cary and Bright (1969), p. 9. 
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while the percentage of quasi-endowments and term endowments is the 
greatest.2 
B. Benefits of Endowments 
Endowments serve a variety of crucial functions for higher education 
institutions.3  First, an endowment provides an institution with a continuous 
source of revenue.  Income from the endowment may be disbursed at the 
discretion of the university’s trustees to support an institution’s operating 
budget.  Unrestricted endowment funds provide universities with the 
flexibility to allocate additional funding to any purpose, such as mitigating 
tuition increases, improving financial aid, hiring a new faculty member, or 
constructing a new building.  Restricted endowment funds that align with an 
institution’s priorities, such as funds for an endowed chair in economics, 
essentially serve the same purpose by allowing universities to reallocate 
general purpose funds that would have otherwise supported the economics 
department.  Restricted endowment funds that do not align with an 
institution’s priorities burden an institution if the income from the fund does 
not fully support the expense of the activity. 
Second, endowments enable institutions to pursue academic priorities 
independent of outside influences.  Similar to restricted gifts from donors, 
government appropriations often support specific purposes, forcing 
institutions to accept the priorities of others or to decline the funds entirely.  
Historical evidence suggests that a primary purpose of creating endowments 
may have been to mitigate the reliance on any one source of funding.4  
                                                 
2 For institutions with greater than one billion in endowment assets, 50.8 percent of endowment assets are 
true endowments, 34.9 percent are quasi-endowments, and 9.0 percent are term endowments; for 
institutions with greater than $500 million but less than one billion in endowment assets, 64.3 percent are 
true endowments, 24.7 percent are quasi-endowments, and 1.9 percent are term endowments. 
3 Massy (1990) presents and elaborates on these functions. 
4 Hansmann (1990), p. 29. 
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However, even consumer demand for certain programs, such as professional 
Master’s degrees, may distort the priorities of a research university.  A report 
of the National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary Education 
identified the “freedom and flexibility to maintain institutional and 
professional integrity and to meet creatively and responsibly their 
educational goals” as a primary value of private postsecondary education.5  
Institutions with larger endowments are less reliant on sources of revenue 
that could limit this flexibility.6  Thus, an institution could choose to support 
a course in the Turkish language with less concern for the demand of the 
course.  Institutions with smaller endowments are “more likely to have to 
elevate economic considerations above academic ones.”7 
Third, endowments contribute to an institution’s assets, bolster its 
balance sheet, provide immediate liquidity, and function as a reserve.  While 
nearly all institutions have policies that govern the amount of income that 
may be disbursed in a given year, these policies are determined by the 
institution and may be amended by the university’s trustees.  Short-term 
borrowing from an endowment may be an appropriate course of action for 
an institution under various circumstances: a recession that increases the 
number of students requiring financial aid, a modification of tax laws that 
diminishes the amount of private donations, or a new federal administration 
with a lesser emphasis on postsecondary education.8  Thus, endowments 
provide a reserve of funds and a source of immediate liquidity. 
                                                 
5 Williamson (1975), p. 24. 
6 Granted, institutions with larger endowment may become reliant on endowment income.  
7 Massy (1990), p. 5. 
8 Hansmann (1990), p. 21. 
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Finally, endowments provide two distinctly different advantages for 
public and private institutions.  At private institutions, endowments serve as 
a substitute for state appropriations.  While operating subsidies from state 
governments have declined substantially over the past decade, state 
appropriations still support a considerable portion of the operating budget at 
public institutions, allowing these institutions to charge lower tuition to their 
students.  Endowments at private institutions provide a means to mitigate 
this difference between public and private tuition rates.  At public 
institutions, endowments provide a means to mitigate the difference 
“between an institution’s financial needs and students’ and taxpayer’s ability 
to finance those needs.”9  Endowments at public institutions ensure that 
these institutions are less constrained by state appropriations.  
C. History of Spending Policies 
The first endowments originated as a source of perpetual support for 
religious organizations during the Middle Ages.  During the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, the beneficiaries of early endowments expanded to 
European universities, followed by American universities in the early years 
of the United States.  The principal of these endowments was land; the 
income from these endowments was the rent derived from the land.  As the 
value of the land escalated over time, the rent increased, protecting the value 
of the rent from inflation.  During this time, separating principal from 
income was unambiguous, and determining a policy to specify the amount of 
spending was unnecessary; organizations and institutions maintained the 
land and depleted the rent each year.   
                                                 
9 Massy (1990), p. XI 
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When institutions first began to invest in financial instruments, 
endowment management remained uncomplicated.  As the recipients of gifts 
and bequests, higher education institutions assumed the role of charitable 
trustees and followed the appropriate trust laws.  One of these laws 
stipulated that endowment managers reference legal lists of securities to 
determine permissible investments.  The investment options for endowment 
managers remained limited until the Harvard College v. Amory court ruling in 
1830.  The ruling in this Massachusetts court case specifies a “prudent man” 
standard whereby endowment managers were free to “exercise the judgment 
and care under the circumstances then prevailing which men of prudence, 
discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs . . 
. considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their 
capital.”10  As long as they were circumspect in their investments, 
endowment managers were no longer obligated to adhere to court-
prescribed lists of securities.   
However, another charitable trust law, the fiduciary accounting 
principle, still limited the options of endowment managers.  The law 
stipulated that charitable trustees treat capital gains (or appreciation) as part 
of the principal of an endowment, rather than as part of the income.  
Because institutions are required to maintain the principal of an endowment 
in perpetuity, colleges and universities expended only the current yield of 
endowment funds.  As a result, endowment managers were pressured to 
create a portfolio of investments with high current yields to provide an 
annual source of revenue to subside the operating budget, even if these 
investments were unlikely to provide a high total return.  Thus, even after 
                                                 
10 Williamson (1975), p. 107. 
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the Harvard College v. Amory ruling, endowment managers had limited 
flexibility to maximize the total return of the endowment. 
By the early twentieth century, endowment assets had shifted from 
entirely real estate holdings to largely fixed-income securities.  Williamson 
(1975) attributes this substitution to the burgeoning availability of bonds and 
mortgages and to the increasing conservatism of endowment managers.  Few 
institutions included equities in their endowment portfolios.  However, the 
limitations of following the fiduciary accounting principle and of holding 
fixed-income portfolios became increasingly apparent during the stock 
market boom of the 1960s.  As Williamson explains, fixed-income portfolios 
provided higher current yields than equity portfolios, while equity portfolios 
provided higher total return.  By holding fixed-income portfolios, 
endowment managers ensured a reasonably constant (albeit modest) stream 
of dividends to support the institution’s operating budget, yet the total 
return of their endowment assets was low, especially compared to the 
booming stock market.  However, institutions that shifted from a fixed-
income to an equity portfolio faced an immediate decline in revenue 
available to support the operating budget.  To compensate for the loss in 
revenue, some institutions reduced budgets, exhausted reserves, expended 
the principal of funds functioning as endowment, or attempted to attract 
additional gifts.  These institutions experienced rapidly increasing total 
returns but enjoyed few advantages from the returns as capital gains were 
added to the principle of the endowment.  On the other hand, institutions 
that were not able to compensate for a loss in revenue maintained portfolios 
dominated by high-yield, low-growth investments and failed to benefit from 
the strong stock market performance entirely.  Clearly, the fiduciary 
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accounting principal constrained the benefits of the strong stock market for 
higher educational endowments. 
In 1969, two watershed publications encouraged institutions to revise 
their endowment management policies.  In The Law and the Lore of Endowment 
Funds, William Cary and Craig Bright conduct an exhaustive analysis of the 
law and conclude that: (1) courts tend to exercise corporate principles when 
determining cases involving the financial administration of higher education 
institutions, (2) capital gains are distinctly treated as income under corporate 
law, and therefore, (3) capital gains on endowment funds without donor 
restricts may be treated as income.11  They find no evidence to support the 
notion that higher education institutions should maintain capital gains as part 
of the principal of their endowments.   
In Managing Educational Endowments, the Ford Foundation Advisory 
Committee on Endowment Management cites a weak record of endowment 
management at higher education institutions in the United States.  According 
to the Committee, endowment managers erred by prioritizing the safety and 
income of endowments above the total return.  The Committee encourages 
the trustees of colleges and universities to focus on maximizing long-term 
total return instead of short-term current yield, believing that an increase in 
the long-term total return of endowment funds would simultaneously allow 
for a greater annual contribution to the operating budget. 
Three years later, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws introduced the Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act (UMIFA) to specify new standards for endowment management.  
Section 2 of this act permits colleges and universities to expend a prudent 
                                                 
11 Ford Foundation Advisory Committee on Endowment Management (1969), p. 23. 
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portion of appreciation.  Section 6 provides a standard for prudence, 
modernizing the prudent man rule from the nineteenth century.  Section 6, 
the Standard of Conduct, stipulates: 
 
In the administration of the powers to appropriate appreciation, to 
make and retain investments, and to delegate investment management 
of institutional funds, members of a governing board shall exercise 
ordinary business care and prudence under the facts and 
circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.12 
 
Over half of the fifty states adopted the act or a modification of the act.   
Spurred by these publications and statutes, universities adopted two 
major changes: (1) investing in growth stocks, and (2) spending of capital 
appreciation.  The adoption of the first change depended on the adoption of 
the second; colleges and universities could not comfortably invest in high-
growth, low-yield securities without appropriating capital gains as income to 
offset the decline in yield.  The adoption of the second change also 
represented the developing notion that the spending in any particular year 
should be appropriate to the long-term earning potential of the endowment 
and to the long-term demands of the institution.  The Yale’s Treasurer’s 
Report for 1965-66 explains: 
 
[I]t is only by coincidence that [spending only current yield] will be a 
correct balance between the present and the future.  Some institutions 
in their particular circumstances ought to save beyond Yield; others in 
theirs ought to spend something beyond Yield. . . . It is a paradox of 
Yale’s current financial situation that the Yield of the present portfolio 
would balance present budgets. . .”13 
                                                 
12 Williamson (1975), p. 120. 
13 Williamson (1975), p. 115. 
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The report continues to explain that if the endowment manager focuses on 
improving current yield by investing in higher yield but lower growth stocks, 
“the future would be prejudiced,” while if the manager focuses on improving 
total return by investing in lower yield but higher growth funds, then 
“service to the present is prejudiced if expenditure must be confined to 
Yield.”14  The limitations on endowment managers precluded the necessity 
to develop and obey a spending policy.  This adjustment to allow the 
spending of capital appreciation requires that the trustees of colleges and 
universities develop a policy to determine a prudent portion of capital gains 
that may be allocated for expenditures.  Thus, endowment management as 
we know it today began.  
D.  Purposes of Endowment Spending Policies 
Prior to World War II, endowment managers concentrated on 
preserving the dollar value of endowment funds, not the purchasing power 
of endowment funds.  The low interest rates of the 1960s and the high 
inflation of the 1970s prompted endowment managers to reconsider their 
focus, especially those who had invested large portions of their portfolios in 
bonds and who had witnessed the purchasing power of their endowments 
decline.  Today, most institutions develop spending policies for endowment 
funds such that the distributions from the endowment fully support the 
activity in perpetuity, despite rising costs.15  For example, an endowed 
scholarship should provide full funding to one student who attends the 
institution today and full funding to one student who attends the institution 
in twenty years, regardless of increases in tuition.  A spending rule that 
                                                 
14 Williamson (1975), p. 116. 
15 Massy (1990), p. 22. 
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achieves this goal provides an institution with the funds to fully support an 
activity indefinitely; a spending rule that does not achieve this goal burdens 
an institution with the funds to support only a continually decreasing 
fraction of the expense of the activity.   However, a spending rule that 
maintains the real value of the endowment also requires the institution to 
reinvest a substantial proportion of appreciation. 
By maintaining the real value of endowment funds, college and 
university trustees ensure intergenerational equity.  Intergenerational equity 
refers to the notion that endowments should provide the same benefits and 
opportunities to future students as to current ones.  Yale economist James 
Tobin presents the most articulate and the most frequently referenced 
argument: 
 
The trustees of an endowment institution are the guardians of the 
future against the claims of the present.  Their task is to preserve 
equity among generations.  The trustees of an endowment university 
like my own assume the institution to be immortal.  They want to 
know, therefore, the rate of consumption from endowment that can 
be sustained indefinitely. . . . In formal terms, the trustees are 
supposed to have a zero rate of time preference.16 
 
As the custodians of an eternal institution, the trustees should value current 
and future spending equally, an onerous task considering “the urgency of 
today’s claims and the intensity with which they are pressed” by current 
stakeholders.17 
 
 
                                                 
16 Tobin (1974), p. 427. 
17 Massy (1990), p. 23. 
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E.  Spending Policies 
Endowment managers struggled to develop appropriate spending 
policies during the 1970s.  For all of its limitations, the traditional spending 
rule of spending only current yield provided two benefits: (1) relatively 
constant income for expenditure, and (2) automatic reinvestment of capital 
gains.  First, because dividends remained stable even as the stock market 
varied, the traditional spending rule offered a predictable stream of income.  
With colleges and universities relying on endowment distributions to support 
operating budgets, reasonable consistency in year-to-year spending or (better 
yet) reasonable consistency in the growth of year-to-year spending is 
necessary.18  Second, because capital gains could not be expended, the 
traditional rule ensured that capital gains were automatically reinvested.  
Without the limitations of the traditional spending rule, the risk of 
diminishing the purchasing power of endowment funds by overspending 
increased.  Colleges and universities recognized the necessity of developing a 
spending rule to balance these two objectives – providing a stable source of 
revenue to the operating budget and maintaining the purchasing power of 
endowment funds – but determining a policy that achieved both of these 
objectives challenged endowment managers. 
Institutions that apply a fixed spending rate to a volatile endowment 
market value face dramatic changes in year-to-year support to the operating 
budget.  The endowment performance will correlate perfectly with the 
endowment payout; if the endowment market value declines by 10 percent, 
then the available funding to support the operating budget will decline by 10 
                                                 
18 Williamson (1975), p. 122. 
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percent.19  Most institutions, especially richer institutions and institutions 
that support a greater percentage of their operating budgets from their 
endowments, cannot accommodate this degree of uncertainty. 
To provide greater stability of endowment distributions, many 
institutions calculate the spending rate as an average of several endowment 
market values.  For example, an institution may adopt a spending rule such 
that the institution spends 5 percent of the moving 3-year average 
endowment market value.  With a longer averaging period, the stability of 
endowment distributions is greater; however, the risk of divergence between 
the target spending rate and the actual spending rate is also greater.20  
Governing boards determine the target spending rate, but for institutions 
that adopt a spending rule dependent on the endowment market value, the 
actual spending rate varies.  The actual spending rate is higher than the target 
spending rate in years when the endowment underperforms expectations 
and lower than the target spending rate in years when the endowment 
outperforms expectations.  Consistent overspending from the target 
spending rate will gradually diminish the purchasing power of endowment 
funds.  Complicating this policy further, the positive effect of one bull year 
or the negative effect of one bear year disproportionately affects the 
spending rate for the length of the averaging period; at the end of the 
averaging period, the spending rate abruptly decreases in the case of a bull 
year or increases in the case of a bear year.  Averaging endowment market 
values helps to smooth the amount of endowment distributions, but one 
year of notable returns still affects the amount of distributions substantially. 
                                                 
19 Williamson (1975), p. 128. 
20 Massy (1990), p. 32. 
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To provide maximum stability of endowment distributions, other 
institutions adopt spending rules that simply omit the endowment market 
value from the determination of endowment distributions.  These 
institutions may decide to increase the prior year’s spending by the inflation 
rate or by another prespecified rate.  Determining an appropriate amount of 
endowment distributions for the first year and an appropriate rate of 
increase for the succeeding years is crucial to the success of this type of 
spending policy.  Additionally, the actual spending rate from the endowment 
is likely to deviate from the target spending rate, and over time, these 
deviations may diminish the real value of endowment funds unless the 
governing board or endowment manager intervenes with ad hoc 
adjustments. 
A growing number of institutions combine two or more spending 
rules to develop a hybrid spending policy.  Yale, for example, determines 
current income as 80 percent of the prior year’s spending and 20 percent of 
the target spending rate of 5.25 percent applied to the prior year’s beginning 
endowment market value, adjusting both calculations for inflation.  
Columbia determines current income as 60 percent of the prior year’s 
spending adjusted for inflation at higher education institutions and 40 
percent of the target spending rate of 5 percent applied to the prior year’s 
beginning endowment market value.  Other institutions determine an 
appropriate spending rate each year or spend a prespecified percentage of 
current yields.   
Finally, colleges and universities can constrain endowment 
distributions with ceilings and floors.  An institution that adopts a spending 
rule of 5 percent of a moving 3-year average of market values can specify 
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that the current year’s dollar-amount of spending will at least equal the prior 
year’s dollar-amount of spending, protecting the nominal value of 
endowment distributions.  An institution that adopts of spending rule of 
increasing spending by 5 percent each year can specify that the amount of 
distributions must range between 4.5 percent and 5.5 percent of a moving 3-
year average of market values, protecting the long-term purchasing power of 
the endowment.  Yale, for example, constrains their spending policy by 
adopting a floor of 4.5 percent and a ceiling of 6 percent of the endowment 
market value. 
E. Literature Review 
Early literature on endowment spending examines extensively the 
definition and classification of endowment income.  Pye (1957) asks whether 
net income should include endowment income for non-profit institutions.  
Cary and Bright (1969) consider whether colleges and universities are subject 
to a legal obligation to classify capital gains as principle of endowment funds.  
In a 1974 publication of the American Economic Review, Nichols, Tobin, 
Litvack, Malkiel, Quandt, Eisner, and Black offer their perspectives on the 
appropriate definition of endowment income.   
Current literature on endowment spending primarily focuses on the 
optimal spending rule to achieve intergenerational equity.  Massy (1976) 
develops a model to guide university financial planning, and Massy, Grinold, 
Hopkins, and Gerson (1981) modify the model to account for the 
uncertainty of exogenous variables such as the endowment market value.  
Coiner (1990) considers the appropriate assumptions to develop a prudent 
policy of spending a fixed percentage of endowment market values.  
Woglom (2003) considers the concept of intergenerational equity as an 
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intertemporal consumption choice with an infinite time horizon and a low 
tolerance for risk.  Basch (1999) considers the actual and optimal spending 
rates of private universities during the early 1990s; Kaufman and Woglom 
(2005) consider the actual and optimal spending rates of top liberal arts 
colleges during the late 1990s.  Kaufman and Woglom (2005) also consider 
the effect of spending rules on spending rates.  Other research, such as 
Tharp (1997), focuses on the appropriate allocation of assets for higher 
education institutions.  To my knowledge, no study has examined if and how 
institutional characteristics are related to endowment spending rates. 
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Chapter 3:  NACUBO Analysis 
A.  Data 
The data for this section contain 1312 observations from 126 colleges 
and universities over an eleven-year period from 1996 to 2006.  The selected 
institutions are listed in Appendix A and were among the 136 American 
higher education institutions with endowments greater than $500 million at 
the end of the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2007.21  Sixty-four percent of 
the selected institutions are private.  Additionally, I classify twenty percent of 
the institutions as “main campus” institutions, where the observations merge 
system data for the dependent variable (such as the University of Texas 
System) and institutional data for the main campus for the explanatory 
variables (such as the University of Texas at Austin).  The frequencies of 
institutions and observations are further specified in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.   
 
Table 3.1:  Frequencies of Institutions 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 81 20 101 
Main Campus 1      24 25 
Total 82 44 126 
 
Table 3.2:  Frequencies of Observations 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 848 210 1058 
Main Campus 11 243 254 
Total 859 453 1312 
                                                 
21 Five of the ten institutions excluded from the analysis do not contain sufficient data; three institutions are 
medical colleges; one is a theological seminary; and one is an outlier.  See Appendix B for details. 
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The data for this section are assembled from five sources.  The 
dependent variable, the annual spending rate from endowment, is gathered 
from the National Association of College and University Business Officers 
Endowment Studies (NES).  Each year, the National Association of College 
and University Business Officers (NACUBO) conducts a voluntary study on 
endowment performance and management practices at higher education 
institutions.  NACUBO calculates the spending rate by dividing the reported 
amount of endowment distributions by the average of the reported 
beginning and ending endowment market values.  To collect the most 
accurate data, I compiled the spending rates reported in the most recent 
study.  Because each study provides ten years of spending rate data, the data 
from 1999 to 2006 are from the 2008 study; the data from 1998 is from the 
2007 study; the data from 1997 is from the 2006 study; and the data from 
1996 is from the 2005 study. 
These studies also provide the spending rules applied by each 
institution to calculate the spending rates.  The definition of each rule is 
described in Table 3.3.  The number of institutions applying each spending 
rule and the number of observations for each spending rule are reported in 
Table 3.4.  While similar, the first (moving 3-year average) rule and the 
second (moving 12-quarter average) rule measure different time periods.  
Institutions that follow the second spending rule average adjust their 
spending rate calculations quarterly, whereas institutions that following the 
first spending rule adjust their spending rate calculations annually.  A quarter 
with particularly poor market returns will decrease the spending rate 
calculations sooner for institutions that adjust their calculations quarterly, 
but the same quarter will decrease the spending rate calculations further into 
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the future for institutions that adjust their spending rate calculations 
annually.  The spending rules are included in the model as dichotomous 
explanatory variables with the second (moving 12-quarter average) rule 
omitted. 
 
Table 3.3:  Definition of Spending Rules 
Rule Definition 
Rule 1 Spend a percentage of moving 3-year average of market values 
Rule 2 Spend a percentage of moving 12-quarter average of market values 
Rule 3 Spend a percentage of moving average of market values other 
Rule 4 Decide on an appropriate rate each year 
Rule 5 Increase prior year's spending by a percentage 
Rule 6 Increase prior year's spending by the inflation rate 
Rule 7 Other spending rule 
 
Table 3.4:  Frequencies of Spending Rules 
Rule 
Number of 
Institutions 
Number of 
Observations 
Rule 1 23 225 
Rule 2 27 283 
Rule 3 19 194 
Rule 4 7 77 
Rule 5 9 99 
Rule 6 1 11 
Rule 7 40 423 
Total 126 1312 
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The majority of the remaining explanatory variables are supplied by 
the Delta Project on Postsecondary Education Costs, Productivity, and 
Accountability, a nonprofit organization that strives to compile data and to 
develop analytical tools to improve college affordability.  The variables 
collected from this source include the control of the institution, the number 
of full-time equivalent enrollments, the total amount of expenditures, the 
total amount of expenditures for research, the tuition discount rate, and the 
total amount of Pell grants disbursed by the institution.  Two variables, the 
control of the institution and the tuition discount rate, are included in the 
analyses without any modifications.  The control of the institution is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the institution is public or private.  
The tuition discount rate is the sum of funded and unfunded institutional 
grants as a proportion of the total revenue from tuition, fees, and 
scholarships applied to tuition and fees; in other words, the tuition discount 
rate is the extent to which colleges and universities “discount” their tuition 
(specifically their tuition revenue) by providing institutional grants to 
students.  From the remaining variables, I calculate the share of total 
expenditures for research and the Pell grant award per full-time equivalent in 
thousands of dollars.   
Two variables are assembled from each of the three remaining 
sources.  The Council for Aid to Education’s Voluntary Support of 
Education surveys provides the endowment market value and the total 
annual giving.  With the number of full-time equivalent enrollments from the 
Delta Project, I calculate the endowment market value per full-time 
equivalent in hundreds of thousands of dollars and the total annual giving 
per full-time equivalent in hundreds of thousands of dollars.  The College 
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Entrance Examination Board’s Annual Survey of College Standard Research 
Complication furnishes the 25th and 75th percentile scores of the verbal and 
mathematics sections of the SAT I.  I average the 25th and 75th percentile 
scores for each section, aggregate the averages, and divide by one-hundred 
to yield a measure of the average combined SAT I score for incoming first-
year students in hundreds of points.  Finally, Yahoo! Finance reports the 
opening value of the Standard and Poor’s 500 on the first day of the calendar 
year and the closing value of the Standard and Poor’s 500 on the last day of 
the calendar year.  I calculate the change in value of the Standard and Poor’s 
500 over a calendar year.  All monetary data are adjusted according to the 
Consumer Price Index and reported in 2006 constant dollars.  Appendix C 
summarizes the sources and definitions of these variables. 
B. Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics, reported in Table 3.5, provide the number of 
observations, the means, the standard deviations, the minimums, the 
medians, and the maximums for the dependent and explanatory variables.  A 
cursory review of these statistics reveals that all of the variables contain a 
wide spread of observations.  The spending rate ranges from 2.3 percent at a 
public university in 2000 to 9.0 percent at a private university in 2000, 2001, 
and 2002.  The span of endowment market values per full-time equivalent is 
especially broad with a minimum of $7,056 per full-time equivalent at the 
University of Maryland-College Park in 1997 and a maximum of $1,926,015 
per full-time equivalent at Princeton University in 2006.  Similarly, the total 
annual giving varies from $929 per full-time equivalent at the University of 
Texas at Austin in 2005 to $86,623 per full-time equivalent at the California 
Institute of Technology in 1999.  The Pell grant award ranges from $42 per 
  
 
 
 
Table 3.5:  Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
spendrate 1312 4.7 0.9066 2.3 4.6 9.0 
endow 1222 2.04 2.5482 0.07 1.09 19.26 
giving 921 0.10 0.0968 0.01 0.08 0.87 
research_share 854 0.13 0.1074 0.00 0.12 0.52 
tuition_discount 1301 0.27 0.1157 0.01 0.27 0.96 
pell 1257 0.33 0.1633 0.04 0.31 1.26 
SAT50 1108 12.73 1.0968 10.10 12.75 15.25 
SP500 1312 0.09 0.1733 -0.23 0.14 0.31 
 2
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full-time equivalent at Harvard University in 1996 to $1,265 per full-time 
equivalent at the University of Miami in 1997.22  Berry College allocated 0.09 
percent of total expenditures to research in 1998, while Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology devoted 52.3 percent of total expenditures to 
research in 1997.  At Howard University, only 1.3 percent of scholarships 
and fellowships were allocated to institutional expenses in 2004; at Cooper 
Union, 95.6 percent of scholarships and fellowships were allocated to 
institutional expenses in 2002.  The average SAT I score of incoming 
freshmen ranges from 1010 at the University of Louisville in 1999 to 1525 at 
the California Institute of Technology in 2002.  These disparities underscore 
that even among the 126 institutions with the highest endowment values, the 
characteristics of the institutions vary radically. 
C. Model 
 The following model is applied to the data: 
      (1)    Sit = a0 + a1 Xit +  εi  i = 1, 2, . . . , 126 
where Sit is the spending rate for institution i in year t, Xit are characteristics 
of the institution, and εi is a random error term.  The characteristics of the 
institution include the spending rule, the endowment market value per full-
time equivalent, the total annual giving per full-time equivalent, the share of 
total expenditures for research, the tuition discount rate, the Pell grant award 
per full-time equivalent, and the combined average of the 25th and 75th 
percentile SAT I scores.23  The model includes dichotomous variables to 
account for missing data.  For each analysis, the model is estimated twice: 
                                                 
22 This value may be an error in the Delta Project’s database.  The second-highest observation is $995 per 
full-time equivalent at the University of Texas at Austin in 2004. 
23 I remove the share of expenditures for research and the spending rules in two regressions; for both 
modifications, the results remain the same while the adjusted R-square decreases. 
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first with the annual return of the Standard and Poor’s 500 and second with 
time dichotomous variables.  For every analysis, the adjusted R-squared is 
greater with the time variables than with the annual return of the Standard 
and Poor’s 500.  While I include the estimates for both, I focus the following 
discussion on the results with the time variables.  All of the institutional 
characteristics were insignificant when I included institutional fixed effects in 
the model; the data lacks sufficient variation over time within institutions to 
identify the effects of institutional characteristics on spending rates.  The 
model is estimated separately for public and private institutions, as well as 
for single campus and main campus institutions.24  Appendix D contains a 
correlation matrix of the explanatory variables.   
D. Empirical Results 
 Table 3.6 reports the results of the regressions.  Columns (1) and (2) 
report the results of the regressions with all institutions; columns (3) and (4) 
report the results of the regressions with private institutions only; and 
columns (5) and (6) report the results of the regressions with public 
institutions only.  From columns (1) and (2), we see that the following 
variables are significant: the control of the institution, the endowment 
market value, the total giving, the share of expenditures for research, the 
tuition discount rate, the Pell grant award, the first (moving 3-year average) 
rule, the third (moving average other) rule, the fourth (decide each year) rule, 
the sixth (increase by inflation) rule, and years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
                                                 
24 I estimate the model separately for institutions with “high” endowments at the end of the 2008 fiscal year 
(institutions with endowment market values greater than the median) and for institutions with “low” 
endowments (institutions with endowment market values less than the median).  I also estimate the model 
separately for institutions with “high” average first-year SAT I scores and “low” average first-year SAT I 
scores where “high” and “low” are defined similarly.  The results for all four regressions are similar to the 
results presented in the following section. 
Table 3.6:  Results for Private and Public Institutions 
 
                 All Institutions              Private Institutions              Public Institutions 
      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
private  0.25974***  0.35380***     
 (0.07773) (0.07811)     
       
endow -0.10610*** -0.09970*** -0.13203*** -0.11974***  0.3520**  0.49693*** 
 (0.01456) (0.01379) (0.01685) (0.01594) (0.17680) (0.17582) 
       
giving  1.24775***  1.48872***  0.98882**  1.44311***  1.05421  0.44619 
 (0.38111) (0.36069) (0.44046) (0.41777) (1.43196) (1.39176) 
       
research_share  1.53468***  1.10684***  1.74082***  1.45230*** -1.37334* -1.35624* 
 (0.30710) (0.29325) (0.37023) (0.35001) (0.75977) (0.73261) 
       
tuition_discount  0.75869***  0.63042**  1.28886***  1.17689*** -0.97850** -1.06882** 
 (0.27005) (0.25578) (0.33929) (0.32375) (0.43774) (0.42171) 
       
pell  0.60968***  0.36378**  0.66013**  0.27564  0.63244***  0.72420*** 
 (0.18893) (0.18047) (0.27622) (0.26402) (0.22770) (0.22485) 
       
SAT50 -0.02375 -0.04852  0.03908 -0.03443 -0.02255 -0.02380 
 (0.03592) (0.03416) (0.04988) (0.04752) (0.05822) (0.05624) 
       
rule1 -0.20035** -0.20813*** -0.57203*** -0.59492***  0.31449***  0.31729*** 
 (0.07922) (0.07476) (0.11453) (0.10756) (0.09643) (0.09313) 
       
rule3 -0.21262*** -0.21721*** -0.44244*** -0.40001***  0.04240  0.03618 
 (0.08145) (0.07686) (0.10817) (0.10195) (0.11117) (0.10725) 
       
rule4 -0.36191*** -0.39786*** -0.58957*** -0.60343*** -0.08970 -0.08326 
 (0.11540) (0.10893) (0.14986) (0.14278) (0.16152) (0.15668) 
       
rule5  0.15440  0.14359  0.00697  0.01214   
 (0.10563) (0.09971) (0.11852) (0.11143)   
       
rule6  0.62397**  0.59354**    0.74410***  0.73456*** 
 (0.26999) (0.25478)   (0.22059) (0.21265) 
 
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
 
rule7 -0.04824 -0.05049 -0.24211*** -0.23151***  0.22341**  0.22828** 
 (0.06855) (0.06477) (0.09131) (0.08592) (0.09203) (0.08885) 
       
SP500  0.30835**   0.24302   0.37057*  
 (0.14779)  (0.19729)  (0.19136)  
       
t97  -0.08214  -0.16513  -0.22927 
  (0.12317)  (0.23906)  (0.15302) 
       
t98  -0.30162**  -0.44571*  -0.36425** 
  (0.13276)  (0.25321)  (0.16313) 
       
t99  -0.37661***  -0.46889*  -0.53758*** 
  (0.13242)  (0.25488)  (0.16036) 
       
t00  -0.27142**  -0.30857  -0.51741*** 
  (0.13350)  (0.25517)  (0.16283) 
       
t01  -0.30389**  -0.42313  -0.39620** 
  (0.13959)  (0.26184)  (0.16926) 
       
t02   0.27027*   0.11763   0.09537 
  (0.15165)  (0.25996)  (0.32912) 
       
t03   0.62952***   0.47271*   0.39395 
  (0.15587)  (0.26403)  (0.34429) 
       
t04   0.51191***   0.47879*   0.08705 
  (0.15650)  (0.26544)  (0.35195) 
       
t05   0.09908   0.07551  -0.36899 
  (0.15656)  (0.26535)  (0.35179) 
       
t06  -0.29082*  -0.60383**  -0.46811** 
  (0.16354)  (0.25000)  (0.19871) 
       
n  1312  1312  859  859  453  453 
Adj R-Square  0.1010  0.2014  0.1339  0.2370  0.1859  0.2465 
Year Dummy  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
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and 2004.25  According to these results, the spending rate for private 
institutions was 0.35 percentage points greater than the spending rate for 
public institutions over this time period, all else equal.  For every additional 
$100,000 of endowment market value per full-time equivalent, the spending 
rate decreased by 0.10 percentage points; for every additional $100,000 of 
annual giving per full-time equivalent or for every additional $1,000 of Pell 
grant awards per full-time equivalent, the spending rate increased by 1.49 
percentage points or 0.36 percentage points, respectively.  I expected to see a 
negative relationship between the spending rate and the endowment market 
value; a richer institution could dispense the same amount of funds with a 
smaller spending rate as a poorer institution could dispense with a larger 
spending rate.  I also expected to see a positive relationship between the 
spending rate and the Pell grant awards; an institution with a larger 
proportion of students from low-income families provided these students 
with greater institutional funding to attract and retain them.  The positive 
relationship between the spending rate and the annual giving per full-time 
equivalent is contrary to my expectations, but the result is not entirely 
surprising.  The finding suggests that gifts from donors for specific activities 
only funded a portion of the total expense of that activity.  For example, a 
gift from a donor for a new science building may have only funded 60% of 
the cost of construction and may have not funded any portion of the 
operating or maintenance costs of the building.  Returning to the other 
variables, the spending rate increased by 0.11 percentage points or 0.06 
percentage points, respectively, when the share of expenditures for research 
                                                 
25 These variables are significant at 95% or 99%; 2002 is also significant at 90%. 
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or the tuition discount rate increased by 10 percentage points.  Consistent 
with my expectations, institutions that devoted a greater proportion of funds 
to research also spent more from their endowments, suggesting that 
institutions funded at least a portion of their research expenses from their 
endowments.  Also consistent with my expectations, institutions that 
discount their tuition revenue more by providing greater institutional grant 
aid to students also spent more from their endowments. 
 Most interesting, the spending rules applied by institutions affected 
the spending rates.  As discussed in Chapter 2, spending rules are policy 
decisions, determined by a Board of Trustees or an Investment Committee 
of a Board of an institution.  These rules are developed and applied to 
provide a consistent amount of endowment distributions to subsidize an 
institution’s operating budget.  As a result, wide fluctuations from year to 
year are undesirable and problematic.  This analysis reveals that this policy 
decision significantly affected the spending rate for an institution.  
Institutions that spent a percentage of a moving 3-year average of market 
values (the first rule), spent a percentage of a moving average of market 
values other than 3-year or 12-quarter (the third rule), or decided on an 
appropriate rate each year (the fourth rule) spent between 0.20 and 0.36 
percentage points less than institutions that spent a percentage of a moving 
12-quarter average of market values (the second rule, omitted from the 
regression).  Meanwhile, institutions that increased the prior year’s spending 
by the inflation rate (the sixth rule) spent 0.62 percentage points more than 
institutions that applied the second rule to determine their spending rate.  
Over this period, institutions minimized their spending rate from the 
endowment by determining an appropriate rate each year (the fourth rule) 
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and maximized their spending rate from the endowment by increasing their 
prior year’s spending by the inflation rate (the sixth rule).  Finally, we see that 
institutions spent between 0.27 and 0.37 percentage points less during each 
year from 1998 to 2001 than during 1996 and that institutions spent between 
0.51 and 0.63 percentage points more during 2003 and 2004. 
 Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the regressions with the 
private institutions only, and columns (5) and (6) report the results of the 
regressions with the public institutions only.  For the private institutions, the 
results for the endowment market value, the annual giving, and the share of 
expenditures for research remain approximately unchanged from the results 
of the regressions with all institutions.  For the public institutions, the results 
for the annual giving and the share of expenditures for research are not 
significant, and the sign on the coefficients for the endowment market value 
reverses.  Thus, the spending rate was 0.50 percentage points greater for 
public institutions with $100,000 more endowment market value per full-
time equivalent.  One possible explanation for this result is that public 
institutions with smaller endowments focused on accumulating their 
endowments and therefore restricted their spending from endowment funds.  
For private institutions, the coefficient on tuition discount increases to 1.18, 
while for public institutions, the coefficient on tuition discount decreases to         
-1.07.  Because the calculation of institutional grant aid included both funded 
and unfunded aid, these results suggest that institutional grant aid is 
primarily funded at public institutions, whereas institutional grant aid is 
primarily unfunded at private institutions.  Funded institutional grants 
include grants for scholarships and fellowships funded by private sources 
such as businesses, foundations, individuals, and foreign governments; 
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unfunded institutional grants include all scholarships and fellowships funded 
by the institution such as athletic scholarships and the matching portion of 
federal, state, and local grants.  If an institution receives funded institutional 
grants, the spending rate should decrease relative to an institution with the 
same tuition discount rate that disburses unfunded institutional grants; if an 
institution disburses unfunded institutional grants, the spending rate should 
increase relative to an institution with the same tuition discount rate that 
receives funded institutional grants.  The result for private institutions is 
consistent with my expectations; as colleges and universities increased their 
institutional grant aid as a proportion of total tuition revenue by 10 
percentage points, the spending rate increased by 0.118 percentage points.  
However, the result for public institutions may reflect the fact that public 
institutions received more funded institutional grant aid than private 
institutions.  The coefficient of Pell grant awards is not significant for private 
institutions but significant at 99% for public institutions; for public 
institutions with an additional $1,000 in Pell grant awards per full-time 
equivalent, the spending rate was 0.72 percentage points greater. 
 The effects of the spending rules vary between public and private 
institutions.  For private institutions, the first (moving 3-year average), the 
third (moving average other), the fourth (decide each year), and the seventh 
(other) rules are significant; for public institutions, the first (moving 3-year 
average), the sixth (increase by inflation), and the seventh (other) are 
significant.  The coefficient on the first rule is negative for private 
institutions and positive for public institutions, indicating that spending a 
percentage of a moving 3-year average of market values decreased the 
spending rate for private institutions and increased the spending rate for 
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public institutions, relative to spending a percentage of a moving 12-quarter 
average of market values.  This result may indicate that quarterly returns 
were better for private institutions and that annual returns were better for 
public institutions over the given time period.  If private institutions adjusted 
their spending rate calculations annually, instead of quarterly, their spending 
rate would have decreased; if public institutions adjusted their spending rate 
calculations annually, instead of quarterly, their spending rate would have 
increased.  Perhaps this result supports the generalization that private 
institutions with larger endowments hold riskier portfolios than public 
institutions with smaller endowments.  Annual NES studies repeatedly 
report that institutions with larger endowments perform better overall than 
those with smaller endowments.  Over the given time period, the average 
annual return of the Standard and Poor’s 500 was 9%, and the median 
annual return was 14%.  Given the strong returns, riskier portfolios may 
have provided larger short-term returns to private institutions over this 
period; thus, calculating the spending rate quarterly would have increased the 
spending rate.  However, conservative portfolios may have provided larger 
long-term returns to public institutions over this period; thus, calculating the 
spending rate quarterly would have decreased the spending rate.  The third 
(moving average other) and the fourth (decide each year) spending rules are 
only significant for private institutions; the sixth (increase by inflation) 
spending rule is only significant for public institutions; and comparing the 
coefficients of the seventh (other) spending rule is inconclusive given that 
the rule encompasses all spending rules other than the other six. 
Table 3.7 reports the results of separate regressions for single campus 
institutions and main campus institutions.  For the 25 main campus 
Table 3.7:  Results for Single and Main Campus Institutions 
 
                 All Institutions              Single Campus Institutions           Main Campus Institutions 
      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
private  0.25974***  0.35380***  0.38969***  0.46890***  1.02168***  1.30056*** 
 (0.07773) (0.07811) (0.09698) (0.09809) (0.26085) (0.25580) 
       
endow -0.10610*** -0.09970*** -0.11697*** -0.10772*** -0.30765 -0.13610 
 (0.01456) (0.01379) (0.01557) (0.01474) (0.21558) (0.20399) 
       
giving  1.24775***  1.48872***  1.27721***  1.61063*** -0.50825 -0.98906 
 (0.38111) (0.36069) (0.40516) (0.38523) (2.00585) (1.87457) 
       
research_share  1.53468***  1.10684***  1.65348***  1.28050*** -2.51262** -2.88218*** 
 (0.30710) (0.29325) (0.33073) (0.31568) (0.99833) (0.92593) 
       
tuition_discount  0.75869***  0.63042**  1.06237***  0.99481*** -0.87166 -1.22716** 
 (0.27005) (0.25578) (0.29840) (0.28419) (0.64204) (0.59478) 
       
pell  0.60968***  0.36378**  0.59860***  0.28297  0.37727  0.65713* 
 (0.18893) (0.18047) (0.22823) (0.21904) (0.36977) (0.34643) 
       
SAT50 -0.02375 -0.04852 -0.01516 -0.06272  0.28697***  0.32087*** 
 (0.03592) (0.03416) (0.04082) (0.03889) (0.10390) (0.09683) 
       
rule1 -0.20035** -0.20813*** -0.28253*** -0.30895***  0.03499 -0.02904 
 (0.07922) (0.07476) (0.09550) (0.09046) (0.14216) (0.13245) 
       
rule3 -0.21262*** -0.21721*** -0.29785*** -0.30217***  0.04075  0.00463 
 (0.08145) (0.07686) (0.09547) (0.09015) (0.14149) (0.13112) 
       
rule4 -0.36191*** -0.39786*** -0.40042*** -0.47167*** -0.49780* -0.63139** 
 (0.11540) (0.10893) (0.13030) (0.12340) (0.28790) (0.26711) 
       
rule5  0.15440  0.14359  0.12388  0.11012   
 (0.10563) (0.09971) (0.11192) (0.10566)   
       
rule6  0.62397**  0.59354**  0.69770**  0.67138**   
 (0.26999) (0.25478) (0.28322) (0.26738)   
       
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
 
rule7 -0.04824 -0.05049 -0.11840 -0.12645*  0.14945  0.12864 
 (0.06855) (0.06477) (0.07980) (0.07535) (0.13134) (0.12204) 
       
SP500  0.30835**   0.20009   0.68646***  
 (0.14779)  (0.16955)  (0.24453)  
       
t97  -0.08214  -0.05483  -0.07582 
  (0.12317)  (0.15206)  (0.18089) 
       
t98  -0.30162**  -0.25192  -0.40474** 
  (0.13276)  (0.16281)  (0.19548) 
       
t99  -0.37661***  -0.29405*  -0.58237*** 
  (0.13242)  (0.16260)  (0.19461) 
       
t00  -0.27142**  -0.16522  -0.59767*** 
  (0.13350)  (0.16390)  (0.19607) 
       
t01  -0.30389**  -0.22151  -0.54625*** 
  (0.13959)  (0.17200)  (0.19923) 
       
t02   0.27027*   0.31845*   0.28649 
  (0.15165)  (0.18236)  (0.29676) 
       
t03   0.62952***   0.64427***   0.70012** 
  (0.15587)  (0.18760)  (0.31543) 
       
t04   0.51191***   0.56748***   0.51687 
  (0.15650)  (0.18673)  (0.32576) 
       
t05   0.09908   0.20834  -0.18094 
  (0.15656)  (0.18686)  (0.32464) 
       
t06  -0.29082*  -0.54189**  -0.24088 
  (0.16354)  (0.21237)  (0.22670) 
       
n  1312  1312  1058  1058  254  254 
Adj R-Square  0.1010  0.2014  0.1109  0.2085  0.3364  0.4378 
Year Dummy  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
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institutions, the spending rate reported by NACUBO reflects the spending 
rate from an endowment supporting multiple institutions, such as the 
University of Texas System.  However, the explanatory reported by the 
remaining sources reflect the characteristics of a single campus, such as the 
University of Texas at Austin.  These observations therefore merge system 
data for the spending rate and institutional data for the explanatory variables.  
For the remaining 101 single campus institutions, these institutions have 
only one campus, such as Amherst College and Princeton University, or 
these institutions report the spending rate for a single campus within a larger 
system, such as the University of California-Berkeley and the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison.  
For ease of comparison, columns (1) and (2) report the results for all 
institutions as in Table 3.6.  Columns (3) and (4) report the results for single 
campus institutions.  We see few substantial differences between the results 
for all institutions and the results for single campus institutions only; the 
only notable difference is that the coefficient of Pell grant awards is not 
significant in the results for single campus institutions only.  Given that 1058 
of the 1312 observations are for single campus institutions, the fact that the 
results are similar is not surprising.  Columns (5) and (6) report the results 
for main campus institutions.  Comparing columns (2) and (6), we see that 
the endowment market value, the total annual giving, the first (moving 3-
year average) rule, and the third (moving average other) rule become 
insignificant for the main campus institutions.  The coefficient for private 
institutions becomes much larger, but given that only one institution is both 
a private institution and a main campus institution, we cannot generalize this 
result.  As in the results for public institutions in Table 3.6, the share of 
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expenses for research and the tuition discount rate become negative, but 
again, given that all but one main campus institutions are public institutions, 
the result is not surprising.  However, the result for SAT I is significant for 
the first time.  As the SAT I score of incoming first-year students increased 
by 100 points, the spending rate increased by 0.32 percentage points.  
Therefore, more selective main campus institutions spent a greater 
percentage from their endowments than less selective main campus 
institutions. 
 Table 3.8 reports the results of separate regressions for private 
institutions (as reported previously in Table 3.6) and for private single 
campus institutions.  Because only one private institution is also a main 
campus institution, the dataset does not contain enough observations to run 
a regression for private main campus institutions.  The results for the private 
single campus institutions are not substantially different for any variable than 
the results for all private institutions. 
 Similarly, Table 3.9 reports the results of separate regressions for 
public institutions (as reported previously in Table 3.6), for public single 
campus institutions, and for public main campus institutions.  For public 
single campus institutions, the coefficient of endowment market value 
increases to 1.12, verifying the positive relationship between the spending 
rate and the endowment market value for public institutions.  The coefficient 
of endowment market value is insignificant for public main campus 
institutions.  Total annual giving remains insignificant; the effect of the 
tuition discount rate remains the same for public single campus and public 
main campus institutions as for all public institutions.  For public main 
campus institutions, the coefficient of the share of expenditures for research 
 
Table 3.8:  Results for Private Single Campus Institutions 
        
                        Private Institutions         Private Institutions, Single Campus 
      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4) 
endow -0.13203*** -0.11974*** -0.13347*** -0.12159*** 
 (0.01685) (0.01594) (0.01667) (0.01582) 
     
giving  0.98882**  1.44311***  1.00833**  1.43502*** 
 (0.44046) (0.41777) (0.43629) (0.41560) 
     
research_share  1.74082***  1.45230***  1.74993***  1.47956*** 
 (0.37023) (0.35001) (0.36652) (0.34764) 
     
tuition_discount  1.28886***  1.17689***  1.31795***  1.21504*** 
 (0.33929) (0.32375) (0.33739) (0.32186) 
     
pell  0.66013**  0.27564  0.69325**  0.34113 
 (0.27622) (0.26402) (0.28237) (0.27230) 
     
SAT50  0.03908 -0.03443  0.05847 -0.01303 
 (0.04988) (0.04752) (0.04984) (0.04776) 
     
rule1 -0.57203*** -0.59492*** -0.51901*** -0.55140*** 
 (0.11453) (0.10756) (0.11485) (0.10826) 
     
rule3 -0.44244***  -0.40001*** -0.39175*** -0.36147*** 
 (0.10817) (0.10195) (0.10828) (0.10241) 
     
rule4 -0.58957*** -0.60343*** -0.55756*** -0.58096*** 
 (0.14986) (0.14278) (0.14901) (0.14259) 
     
rule5  0.00697  0.01214  0.05050  0.04806 
 (0.11852) (0.11143) (0.11846) (0.11162) 
     
rule7 -0.24211*** -0.23151*** -0.19883** -0.19664** 
 (0.09131) (0.08592) (0.09171) (0.08646) 
     
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
 
SP500  0.24302   0.25233  
 (0.19729)  (0.19603)  
     
t97  -0.16513  -0.14898 
  (0.23906)  (0.23751) 
     
t98  -0.44571*  -0.44881* 
  (0.25321)  (0.25208) 
     
t99  -0.46889*  -0.47621* 
  (0.25488)  (0.25334) 
     
t00  -0.30857  -0.31502 
  (0.25517)  (0.25357) 
     
t01  -0.42313  -0.45510* 
  (0.26184)  (0.26091) 
     
t02   0.11763   0.07837 
  (0.25996)  (0.25900) 
     
t03   0.47271*   0.41382 
  (0.26403)  (0.26423) 
     
t04   0.47879*   0.42298 
  (0.26544)  (0.26451) 
     
t05   0.07551   0.04742 
  (0.26535)  (0.26477) 
     
t06  -0.60383**  -0.69349*** 
  (0.25000)  (0.26773) 
     
n  859  859  848  848 
Adj R-Square  0.1339  0.2370  0.1321  0.2310 
Year Dummy  no  yes  no  yes 
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Table 3.9:  Results for Public Single and Public Main Campus Institutions 
                         
              Public Institutions  Public Institutions, Single Campus   Public Campus, Main Campus 
      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
endow  0.3520**  0.49693***  0.93902**  1.12301*** -0.15365 -0.06427 
 (0.17680) (0.17582) (0.37523) (0.38994) (0.22200) (0.21525) 
       
giving  1.05421  0.44619  2.13851  1.89367 -0.08634 -0.44125 
 (1.43196) (1.39176) (2.26490) (2.28423) (1.93913) (1.85657) 
       
research_share -1.37334* -1.35624* -0.77437 -0.70577 -2.34938** -2.40042** 
 (0.75977) (0.73261) (1.17575) (1.15390) (0.98537) (0.93340) 
       
tuition_discount -0.97850** -1.06882** -1.66649** -1.64236*** -1.10435* -1.36692** 
 (0.43774) (0.42171) (0.64032) (0.62754) (0.62381) (0.59267) 
       
pell  0.63244***  0.72420***  0.41270  0.40803  0.78395**  0.93770** 
 (0.22770) (0.22485) (0.37438) (0.36747) (0.38054) (0.37191) 
       
SAT50 -0.02255 -0.02380 -0.28233*** -0.29509***  0.29795***  0.30905*** 
 (0.05822) (0.05624) (0.08938) (0.08760) (0.10111) (0.09670) 
       
rule1  0.31449***  0.31729***  0.36002**  0.37359***  0.02897 -0.01254 
 (0.09643) (0.09313) (0.14425) (0.14176) (0.13707) (0.13198) 
       
rule3  0.04240  0.03618 -0.40287** -0.38800**  0.05564  0.02032 
 (0.11117) (0.10725) (0.19242) (0.18884) (0.13594) (0.12903) 
       
rule4 -0.08970 -0.08326 -0.44096 -0.42243 -0.59028** -0.68286** 
 (0.16152) (0.15668) (0.28249) (0.28007) (0.27851) (0.26484) 
       
rule6  0.74410***  0.73456***  0.67172**  0.63966**   
 (0.22059) (0.21265) (0.26287) (0.25661)   
       
rule7  0.22341**  0.22828** -0.04536 -0.02665  0.17219  0.15039 
 (0.09203) (0.08885) (0.14508) (0.14162) (0.12680) (0.12086) 
       
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 3.9 (Continued) 
 
SP500  0.37057*   0.01068   0.68153***  
 (0.19136)  (0.27974)  (0.23843)  
t97  -0.22927  -0.37636  -0.07730 
  (0.15302)  (0.23653)  (0.18180) 
       
t98  -0.36425**  -0.24838  -0.41051** 
  (0.16313)  (0.25520)  (0.19857) 
       
t99  -0.53758***  -0.40406  -0.61379*** 
  (0.16036)  (0.24977)  (0.19676) 
       
t00  -0.51741***  -0.31428  -0.63318*** 
  (0.16283)  (0.25886)  (0.19773) 
       
t01  -0.39620**  -0.04854  -0.59704*** 
  (0.16926)  (0.27364)  (0.20283) 
       
t02   0.09537   0.52979   0.02122 
  (0.32912)  (0.72904)  (0.35023) 
       
t03   0.39395   0.80620   0.36447 
  (0.34429)  (0.73285)  (0.37726) 
       
t04   0.08705   0.40073   0.16091 
  (0.35195)  (0.73322)  (0.39191) 
       
t05  -0.36899   0.07436  -0.44558 
  (0.35179)  (0.73282)  (0.39199) 
       
t06  -0.46811**  -0.29813  -0.31491 
  (0.19871)  (0.33622)  (0.24146) 
       
n  453  453  210  210  243  243 
Adj R-Square  0.1859  0.2465  0.2546  0.2951  0.2707  0.3531 
Year Dummy  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
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is significant and negative.  According to these results, as the share of 
expenditures for research increased by 10 percentage points, the spending 
rate decreased by 0.24 percentage points.  This result suggests that a smaller 
portion of the costs of research at public main campus institutions were 
supported by endowment distributions than at private institutions, where the 
relationship between the spending rate and the share of expenditures for 
research is positive.  The coefficient of Pell grant awards is insignificant for 
public single campus institutions but remains significant for public main 
campus institutions.  Interestingly, the coefficient of SAT I is significant for 
both public single campus and public main campus institutions, but the 
effects are the reverse; at public single campus institutions, the relationship 
between the spending rate and SAT I score is negative, while at public main 
campus institutions, the relationship is positive.  Thus, selectivity decreased 
the spending rate at public single campus institutions and increased the 
spending rate at public main campus institutions.  While I expected that 
more selective institutions spent more from their endowments, I did not 
expect the reverse relationship for public single campus institutions. 
 Looking at the coefficients of the spending rules, we see that the 
effects of most of the spending rules either remain the same for public single 
campus and public main campus as for all public institutions or become 
insignificant.  A few exceptions are rule three (moving average other), which 
becomes significant for public single campus institutions, and rule four 
(decide each year), which becomes significant for public main campus 
institutions.  However, given the small sample sizes for each of these rules, 
developing any generalizations based on these results is difficult.  Finally, we 
see that the time variables – both the annual returns of the Standard and 
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Poor’s 500 and the time dichotomous variables – are significant for the 
public main campus institutions but not the public single campus 
institutions.  This result supports our conclusions from Tables 3.6 and 3.7, 
where the time variables were largely significant for the public institutions 
only and for the main campus institutions only. 
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Chapter 4:  Senate Finance Committee Analysis 
A. Data 
In January 2008, the United States Senate Finance Committee 
requested detailed endowment information from the 136 American higher 
education institutions with endowments greater than $500 million at the end 
of the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2007.  The request, signed by Chairman 
Max Baucus and ranking minority member Charles Grassley, highlights the 
rising costs of postsecondary education and the strong endowment returns 
for the richest institutions.  Seven of their eleven questions focus on 
endowment policies, including the mission of endowments, the growth of 
endowments, the asset allocation of endowment funds, the management of 
endowments, the cost of management of endowments, and the payout from 
endowments.  They solicit information for the ten years preceding their 
request. 
The data for this section contain 366 observations from 41 colleges 
and universities.  The selected institutions are listed in Appendix E and are 
among the 42 colleges and universities to provide complete and accessible 
responses to the public as well as to the Senate Finance Committee.26  For 
34 of the 41 institutions, the data contain observations for the nine-year 
period from 1998 to 2006; of the remaining seven institutions, three provide 
observations for a slightly longer period and four provide observations for a 
slightly shorter period.  Sixty-six percent of the selected institutions are 
private.  The two to one ratio of private to public institutions in this chapter 
is approximately the same as the ratio of private to public institutions in the 
                                                 
26 The one institution excluded from the analysis is an outlier.  See Appendix F for details. 
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prior chapter.  Additionally, I classify twenty-two percent of the institutions 
as main campus institutions, nearly the same percentage as in Chapter 3.  
The frequencies of institutions and observations are further specified in 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 
 
Table 4.1:  Frequencies of Institutions 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 27 5 32 
Main Campus 0       9 9 
Total 27 14 41 
 
Table 4.2:  Frequencies of Observations 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 239 45 284 
Main Campus 0 82 82 
Total 239 127 366 
 
The data for this section are assembled from six sources.  The sources 
and the definitions of the eight explanatory variables from the prior chapter 
remain the same, including the definitions of the spending rules.  The 
number of institutions applying each spending rule and the number of 
observations for each spending rule are reported in Table 4.3.  However, the 
dependent variable, the annual spending rate from the endowment, is 
calculated from the responses to the Senate Finance Committee.  The Senate 
Finance Committee requested that institutions report the dollar amount of 
distributions from the endowment.  From this variable and from the 
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endowment market values reported by the Council of Aid to Education, I 
calculate the spending rate as a percentage of the average of the beginning 
and ending endowment market value.  With a new source for the dependent 
variable, I run the same regressions as in the prior chapter and compare the 
results.  Additionally, I calculate the spending rate as a percentage of the 
beginning endowment market value and substitute these rates for the 
dependent variable to test the robustness of the results.  While the sample 
size from the responses to the  
 
Table 4.3:  Frequencies of Spending Rules 
Rule 
Number of 
Institutions 
Number of 
Observations 
Rule 1 3 26 
Rule 2 10 88 
Rule 3 6 53 
Rule 4 4 36 
Rule 5 3 27 
Rule 6 0 0 
Rule 7 15 136 
Total 41 366 
 
Senate Finance Committee in this chapter is much smaller than the 
sample size from the annual NACUBO studies in the prior chapter, this part 
is only intended to verify the results of Chapter 3.  Appendix C summarizes 
the sources and definitions of these variables. 
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B. Summary Statistics 
 The summary statistics, reported in Table 4.4, provide the number of 
observations, the means, the standard deviations, the minimums, the 
medians, and the maximums for the dependent and explanatory variables.  
Again, the variables capture a wide scope of observations.  The spending rate 
as reported by NACUBO ranges from 2.4 percent at Pomona College in 
2001 to 8.3 percent at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 2005; the spending 
rate as calculated from the responses to the Senate Finance Committee as a 
percentage of the average of the beginning and ending endowment market 
values ranges from 1.4 percent at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities in 
2006 to 10.7 percent at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor in 2000; the 
spending rate as calculated from the responses to the Senate Finance 
Committee as a percentage of the beginning market values ranges from 1.5 
percent at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities in 2006 to 12.8 percent at 
the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor in 2000.  The span of endowment 
market values per full-time equivalent remains particularly broad with a 
minimum of $10,507 at the University of Texas at Austin in 1998 to a 
maximum of $192,602 at Princeton University in 2006.  Similarly, the total 
annual giving spans from $929 per full-time equivalent at the University of 
Texas at Austin in 2005 to $59,452 per full-time equivalent at Stanford 
University in 2006.  The Pell grant award varies from $44 per full-time 
equivalent at Harvard University in 2000 to $995 per full-time equivalent at 
the University of Texas at Austin in 2004.  Grinnell College allocated 1.0 
percent of expenditures to research in 2000, while Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology allocated 48.2 percent of expenditures to research in 1999.  At 
the University of Iowa, only 5.2 percent of scholarships and fellowships were 
 Table 4.4:  Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
spendrate 356 4.5 0.7887 2.4 4.5 8.3 
spendrate_ave 366 4.2 1.1060 1.4 4.2 10.7 
spendrate_beg 366 4.4 1.1577 1.5 4.4 12.8 
endow 363 3.12 3.6594 0.11 1.75 19.26 
giving 312 0.14 0.0975 0.01 0.11 0.59 
research_share 268 0.16 0.0928 0.01 0.16 0.48 
tuition_discount 365 0.28 0.1115 0.05 0.27 0.60 
pell 348 0.32 0.1791 0.04 0.30 1.00 
SAT50 307 13.25 1.0759 10.95 13.35 15.00 
SP500 366 0.06 0.1702 -0.23 0.09 0.31 
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allocated to the institution in 2003; at Princeton University, 60.2 percent of 
scholarships and fellowships were allocated to the institution in 2005.  The 
average SAT I score of incoming freshmen ranges from 1095 at Indiana 
University-Bloomington in 2001 to 1500 at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in 2005.  Again, even among the richest colleges and universities 
in the United States, wide variations exist across all variables. 
C. Model 
 The following model is applied to the data: 
      (1)    Sit = a0 + a1 Xit +  εi  i = 1, 2, . . . , 126 
where Sit is the spending rate for institution i in year t, Xit are characteristics 
of the institution, and εi is a random error term.  The characteristics of the 
institution include the spending rule, the endowment market value per full-
time equivalent, the total annual giving per full-time equivalent, the share of 
total expenditures for research, the tuition discount rate, the Pell grant award 
per full-time equivalent, and the combined average of the 25th and 75th 
percentile SAT I scores.  The model includes dichotomous variables to 
account for missing data.  The model is estimated for three dependent 
variables: the spending rate reported by NACUBO, the spending rate 
calculated as a percentage of the average of the beginning and ending 
endowment market values, and the spending rate calculated as a percentage 
of the beginning endowment market value.  The model is estimated 
separately for private institutions and for single campus institutions; with 
only fourteen public institutions and nine main campus institutions, the 
samples are too small to estimate the model separately for public institutions 
or main campus institutions.  For each analysis, the model is estimated twice: 
first with the annual return of the Standard and Poor’s 500 and second with 
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time dichotomous variables.  Similar to Chapter 3, the adjusted R-squared is 
greater with the time variables than with the annual return of the Standard 
and Poor’s 500.  Appendix H contains a correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables.   
D. Empirical Results 
 Table 4.5 reports the results of the regressions for all institutions.  
Columns (1) and (4) report the results of regressions where the dependent 
variable is the spending rate reported by NACUBO; columns (2) and (5) 
report the results of the regressions where the dependent variable is the 
spending rate calculated as a percentage of the average of the beginning and 
ending endowment market values; and columns (3) and (6) report the results 
of the regressions where the dependent variable is the spending rate 
calculated as a percentage of the beginning endowment market value.  
Comparing columns (2) and (5) with columns (3) and (6) respectively, we see 
few notable differences between the results of the regressions with the 
spending rate calculated as a percentage of the average of the beginning and 
ending endowment market values and the results of the regressions with the 
spending rate calculated as a percentage of the beginning endowment market 
value.  Additionally, the unreported results of a regression with the spending 
rate calculated as a percentage of the prior year’s beginning endowment 
market value were similar.  We can conclude that the calculation of spending 
rate has little effect on the results of the regressions.  Because NACUBO 
calculates the spending rate as a percentage of the average of the beginning 
and ending endowment market values, the following discussion will focus on 
the differences between the spending rate as reported by NACUBO and the  
Table 4.5:  Results for All Institutions 
                       
 NACUBO SFC, Average SFC, Beginning NACUBO SFC, Average SFC, Beginning 
      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
       
private -0.09243 -0.36359* -0.43743**  0.10497 -0.17742 -0.27713 
 (0.13868) (0.20325) (0.21593) (0.13190) (0.19884) (0.21439) 
       
endow -0.06248*** -0.13046*** -0.12916*** -0.06405*** -0.13703*** -0.13910*** 
 (0.01867) (0.02866) (0.03045) (0.01683) (0.02663) (0.02872) 
       
giving  0.09449  0.62300  1.00565  0.61574  1.28725  1.66475* 
 (0.60518) (0.93533) (0.99370) (0.54508) (0.86995) (0.93798) 
       
research_share  2.65886***  0.99534  0.81639  1.99879***  0.09554 -0.02068 
 (0.52447) (0.80756) (0.85796) (0.47421) (0.75241) (0.81125) 
       
tuition_discount  0.72459  2.39521***  2.35446***  0.31607  1.91291**  1.93410** 
 (0.52739) (0.80840) (0.85885) (0.47475) (0.75090) (0.80962) 
       
pell  0.42781 -0.39079 -0.49376  0.22485 -0.75668* -0.87092** 
 (0.27471) (0.41533) (0.44124) (0.25060) (0.38971) (0.42018) 
       
SAT50 -0.22866***  0.04054  0.06748 -0.19636***  0.08059  0.08607 
 (0.06443) (0.09839) (0.10453) (0.05790) (0.09115) (0.09828) 
       
rule1 -0.07720 -0.73771*** -0.69486** -0.12958 -0.83964*** -0.80856*** 
 (0.17004) (0.26375) (0.28021) (0.15249) (0.24420) (0.26330) 
       
rule3  0.26712** -0.37604** -0.35112*  0.23474** -0.48867*** -0.46689** 
 (0.12575) (0.18369) (0.19516) (0.11247) (0.17038) (0.18371) 
       
rule4 -0.12062 -0.77337*** -0.76823*** -0.12774*** -0.76923*** -0.76396*** 
 (0.14598) (0.22582) (0.23992) (0.13045) (0.20830) (0.22458) 
       
rule5  0.49297***  0.19740  0.18437  0.46772***  0.14785  0.15536 
 (0.16983) (0.26280) (0.27920) (0.15172) (0.24251) (0.26147) 
       
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
 
rule7 -0.05738 -0.21440 -0.15720 -0.08638 -0.25812* -0.20326 
 (0.10105) (0.15662) (0.16639) (0.09084) (0.14535) (0.15672) 
       
SP500  0.58922***  0.28480  0.67655*    
 (0.21312) (0.32566) (0.34599)    
       
t97     0.15891 -0.09695 -0.10892 
    (0.36493) (0.58431) (0.63000) 
       
t99     0.09299  0.18427  0.08202 
    (0.13880) (0.21951) (0.23668) 
       
t00     0.03009  0.18596  0.34526 
    (0.14021) (0.22047) (0.23771) 
       
t01     0.01491  0.40291*  0.02440 
    (0.14301) (0.22660) (0.24432) 
       
t02     0.57138***  1.05524***  0.57881** 
    (0.15018) (0.23727) (0.25583) 
       
t03     1.08053***  1.61015***  1.31874*** 
    (0.15562) (0.24593) (0.26516) 
       
t04     1.03023***  1.33706***  1.32629*** 
    (0.15371) (0.24381) (0.26288) 
       
t05     0.66346***  1.11145***  1.07489*** 
    (0.15295) (0.24272) (0.26170) 
       
t06     0.06499  0.86614**  0.93042** 
    (0.22842) (0.35621) (0.38407) 
       
n  356  366  366  356  366  366 
Adj R-Square  0.2945  0.1349  0.1088  0.4389  0.2660  0.2212 
Year Dummy  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
 
 5
1
 
 52 
spending rate as reported to the Senate Finance Committee, calculated the 
same way. 
  The variables that are significant for both of these spending rates 
include the endowment market value per student, the third (moving average 
other) rule, the fourth (decide each year) rule, and the time dichotomous 
variables.  With an additional hundred-thousand dollars of endowment 
market value per full-time equivalent, the spending rate as reported by 
NACUBO decreased by 0.06 percentage points, and the spending rate as 
reported to the Senate Finance Committee decreased by 0.14 percentage 
points, all else equal.  The sign on the coefficient of the third (moving 
average other) rule reverses; according to the spending rates reported by 
NACUBO, institutions that applied the third (moving average other) 
spending rule spent 0.23 percentage points more than institutions that 
applied the second (moving 12-quarter average) spending rule, whereas 
according to the spending rates reported to the Senate Finance Committee, 
institutions that applied the third (moving average other) spending rule spent 
0.49 percentage points less than institutions that applied the second (moving 
12-quarter average) spending rule.  The sign on the coefficient of the fourth 
(decide each year) rule remains the same; institutions that applied the fourth 
(decide each year) spending rule spent less than institutions that applied the 
second (moving 12-quarter average) spending rule. 
 The variables that are significant for only one of the two spending 
rates are the share of expenditures for research, the tuition discount rate, the 
average incoming freshmen SAT I score, the first (moving 3-year average) 
spending rule, and the fifth (increase by percentage) spending rule.  Most 
notably, the coefficients on the share of expenditures for research, the 
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average incoming freshman SAT I score, and the fifth (increase by 
percentage) spending rule are significant at 99% for the spending rates 
reported by NACUBO but insignificant for the spending rates reported to 
the Senate Finance Committee.  On the other hand, the coefficients on the 
tuition discount rate and the first (moving 3-year average) spending rule are 
significant at 95% and 99%, respectively, for the spending rates reported to 
the Senate Finance Committee but insignificant for the spending rates 
reported to NACUBO.  Thus, the results provide only limited support for 
the results in the prior chapter and raise concerns on the conclusions 
regarding the share of expenditures for research, the tuition discount rate, 
the average incoming freshman SAT I score, and the spending rules. 
 Table 4.6 reports the results of the regressions with the private 
institutions only.  The regressions with the time dichotomous variables are 
excluded because the variables correlated perfectly with the dichotomous 
variables reflecting missing data.  Again, the results for the spending rates 
reported by the Senate Finance Committee, either reflecting the spending 
rate as a percentage of the average of the beginning and ending endowment 
market values or the spending rate as a percentage of the beginning 
endowment market value, are very similar.  The only notable exception is the 
coefficient of the Standard and Poor’s 500; the coefficient is smaller and 
significant at 90% for the spending rate as a percentage of the average yet 
larger and significant at 99% for the spending rate as a percentage of the 
beginning endowment market value.  This result reflects the fact that 
institutions determine endowment distributions long before the end of the 
fiscal year; thus, the spending rates are more closely connected to the 
beginning endowment market value than the average of the beginning and 
Table 4.6:  Results for Private Institutions 
 
 NACUBO SFC, Average SFC, Beginning 
      (1)      (2)      (3) 
    
endow -0.10190*** -0.16181*** -0.15906*** 
 (0.02555) (0.02780) (0.02852) 
    
giving  0.22732 -0.45283  0.12320 
 (0.67781) (0.73770) (0.75658) 
    
research_share  3.23770***  2.18530***  2.02983*** 
 (0.63035) (0.68580) (0.70336) 
    
tuition_discount  1.81632***  3.60867***  3.51760*** 
 (0.67675) (0.73640) (0.75524) 
    
pell  1.00306**  0.68006  0.53306 
 (0.43340) (0.47077) (0.48282) 
    
SAT50  0.01481  0.31794**  0.30838** 
 (0.11782) (0.12826) (0.13155) 
    
rule1 -0.34411 -0.82378*** -0.78637*** 
 (0.20994) (0.22831) (0.23416) 
    
rule3  0.23154 -0.14480 -0.12302 
 (0.17655) (0.19216) (0.19708) 
    
rule4 -0.18598 -0.57880*** -0.56303*** 
 (0.18293) (0.19871) (0.20379) 
    
rule5  0.30726*  0.12670  0.09228 
 (0.18238) (0.19849) (0.20357) 
    
rule7 -0.45979*** -0.58014*** -0.54421*** 
 (0.14046) (0.15288) (0.15680) 
    
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
 
SP500  0.58310**  0.52754*  0.92890*** 
 (0.25700) (0.27901) (0.28615) 
    
t97    
    
    
t99    
    
    
t00    
    
    
t01    
    
    
t02    
    
    
t03    
    
    
t04    
    
    
t05    
    
    
t06    
    
    
n  238  239  239 
Adj R-Square  0.3386  0.3772  0.3437 
Year Dummy  no  no  no 
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ending endowment market values.  However, given the similarities between 
these two regressions, the following discussion focuses on the results from 
the regressions where the spending rate reflects a percentage of the average 
of the beginning and ending endowment market values. 
 Similar to the regressions with all institutions, the coefficients on the 
endowment market value per full-time equivalent are significant for the 
spending rates reported by NACUBO and for the spending rates reported to 
the Senate Finance Committee.  With an additional hundred-thousand 
dollars of endowment market value per full-time equivalent, the spending 
rate as reported by NACUBO decreased by 0.10 percentage points and the 
spending rate as reported to the Senate Finance Committee decreased by 
0.16 percentage points.  Unlike the regressions with all institutions, the 
coefficients on the shares of expenditures for research and the tuition 
discount rates are significant at 99% for both spending rates.  The spending 
rate as reported by NACUBO increased by 0.32 percentage points when an 
additional ten percent of expenditures were allocated to research; the 
spending rate as reported to the Senate Finance Committee increased by 
0.22 percentage points when an additional ten percent of expenditures were 
allocated to research.  Likewise, the spending rate as reported by NACUBO 
increased by 0.18 percentage points when institutions discounted their 
tuition revenues by 10 percentage points, and the spending rate as reported 
to the Senate Finance Committee increased by 0.36 percentage points when 
institutions discounted their tuition revenues by 10 percentage points.  The 
coefficients on the seventh (other) spending rule are also both significant at 
99% and similar in magnitude.  Thus, we are reassured of the robustness of 
the results of these variables for private institutions.  On the other hand, the 
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coefficient on the Pell grant award is significant at 95% for the spending 
rates reported by NACUBO but insignificant for the spending rates reported 
to the Senate Finance Committee.  The coefficients on the first (moving 3-
year average) rule and the fourth (decide each year) rule are significant at 
99% for the spending rates reported to the Senate Finance Committee but 
insignificant for the spending rates reported by NACUBO.  For private 
institutions, these results raise concerns on the conclusions of the effects of 
these variables on spending rates. 
Finally, Table 4.7 provides the results of the regressions for single 
campus institutions only.  These regressions exclude observations where the 
amount of distributions reported in the responses to the Senate Finance 
Committee reflects the amount of distributions from an endowment 
supporting multiple institutions; because the explanatory variables reflect the 
characteristics of a single campus, the excluded observations merge system 
data and institutional data.  Again, the adjusted R-squared is greater for the 
results of the regressions with the time dichotomous variables, and again, the 
results for the regressions where the spending rate reflects a percentage of 
the average of the beginning and ending endowment market values and the 
results for the regressions where the spending rate reflects a percentage of 
the beginning endowment market values are similar. 
The results for single campus institutions are similar to the results for all 
institutions from Table 4.5.  The coefficients on endowment market value, 
the first (moving 3-year average) rule, and the seventh (other) rule are 
comparable in sign and magnitude for the spending rates as reported by 
NACUBO and for the spending rates as reported to the Senate Finance 
Committee.  The coefficients on annual giving, the share of expenditures for 
Table 4.7:  Results for Single Campus Institutions 
 
 NACUBO SFC, Average SFC, Beginning NACUBO SFC, Average SFC, Beginning 
     (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
       
private  0.19022 -0.70641*** -0.76026***  0.43824** -0.49841** -0.56619** 
 (0.19037) (0.22841) (0.23562) (0.17442) (0.21951) (0.22926) 
       
endow -0.08552*** -0.17758*** -0.17523*** -0.08760*** -0.18078*** -0.17820*** 
 (0.02182) (0.02620) (0.02703) (0.01894) (0.02384) (0.02490) 
       
giving  0.29035 -0.45067  0.00595  1.15411**  0.47490  0.85348 
 (0.65522) (0.78631) (0.81113) (0.58214) (0.73279) (0.76532) 
       
research_share  3.05629***  1.51609**  1.42869**  2.34742***  0.72664  0.74674 
 (0.56805) (0.68152) (0.70304) (0.50061) (0.63014) (0.65811) 
       
tuition_discount  1.32480**  3.95641***  3.96035***  0.94664*  3.58181***  3.55642*** 
 (0.59977) (0.72034) (0.74308) (0.52174) (0.65658) (0.68572) 
       
pell  0.20624 -0.65446 -0.76754 -0.12316 -1.04824** -1.09472** 
 (0.37900) (0.45436) (0.46870) (0.33229) (0.41814) (0.43669) 
       
SAT50 -0.18248**  0.21843**  0.21118** -0.18571***  0.21655**  0.18706** 
 (0.08130) (0.09766) (0.10074) (0.07067) (0.08896) (0.09291) 
       
rule1 -0.25385 -0.86418*** -0.81362*** -0.35017** -0.96869*** -0.91169*** 
 (0.19389) (0.23263) (0.23998) (0.16813) (0.21145) (0.22084) 
       
rule3  0.35654** -0.18979 -0.16153  0.30075** -0.24307 -0.22541 
 (0.14152) (0.16995) (0.17532) (0.12261) (0.15427) (0.16112) 
       
rule4 -0.09473 -0.43923** -0.40581* -0.18740 -0.52650*** -0.49586** 
 (0.17619) (0.21134) (0.21801) (0.15332) (0.19252) (0.20107) 
       
rule5  0.44827**  0.37319*  0.34959  0.38655**  0.30860  0.30160 
 (0.17378) (0.20878) (0.21537) (0.15081) (0.18981) (0.19824) 
       
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table 4.7 (Continued) 
 
rule7 -0.30731** -0.34625** -0.29766* -0.36284*** -0.39480*** -0.34614** 
 (0.12657) (0.15205) (0.15685) (0.11011) (0.13860) (0.14475) 
       
SP500  0.56376**  0.48694*  0.86980***    
 (0.23715) (0.28392) (0.29288)    
       
t97     0.02924 -0.11022 -0.07737 
    (0.42599) (0.53620) (0.56000) 
       
t99     0.12018  0.17420  0.07347 
    (0.14982) (0.18859) (0.19696) 
       
t00     0.03659  0.00178  0.15114 
    (0.15184) (0.18981) (0.19823) 
       
t01     0.04698  0.11028 -0.26274 
    (0.15628) (0.19644) (0.20516) 
       
t02     0.57445***  0.72139***  0.25081 
    (0.15804) (0.19879) (0.20761) 
       
t03     1.07608***  1.15937***  0.86259*** 
    (0.16691) (0.20892) (0.21819) 
       
t04     1.03936***  1.03932***  1.02150*** 
    (0.16209) (0.20396) (0.21301) 
       
t05     0.73711***  0.78197***  0.75040*** 
    (0.16094) (0.20252) (0.21151) 
       
t06    -0.12326  0.10534  0.10819 
    (0.32008) (0.39273) (0.41016) 
       
n  283  284  284  284  284  284 
Adj R-Square  0.2937  0.3328  0.3020  0.4721  0.4525  0.4130 
Year Dummy  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
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research, the third (moving average other) rule, and the fifth (increase by 
percentage) rule are all significant at 95% or 99% for the spending rates as 
reported by NACUBO but insignificant for the spending rates as reported to 
the Senate Finance Committee.  The coefficients on the tuition discount 
rate, the Pell grant award, and the fourth (decide each year) rule are all 
significant at 95% or 99% for the spending rates as reported to the Senate 
Finance Committee but insignificant for the spending rates as reported by 
NACUBO.  For the control of the institution and the average incoming 
freshman SAT I score, the coefficients are significant for both spending 
rates but are different signs.  The spending rate was 0.44 percentage points 
greater at private institutions as reported by NACUBO but 0.50 percentage 
points less at private institutions as reported to the Senate Finance 
Committee.  The spending rate was 0.19 percentage points less at more 
selective institutions as reported by NACUBO but 0.22 percentage points 
greater as reported to the Senate Finance Committee.  These findings are 
inconclusive. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
 Over the past decade, tuition increased at nearly twice the rate of 
inflation at colleges and universities across the country. Simultaneously, at 
elite colleges and universities, endowment values doubled, tripled, or even 
quadrupled over the same period.  As a result, higher education institutions 
have experienced burgeoning public scrutiny and criticism for “hoarding” 
their wealth.  Given these criticisms, the United States Senate Finance 
Committee requested detailed enrollment, financial aid, and endowment data 
from the 136 American colleges and universities with endowments greater 
than $500 million at the end of the 2007 fiscal year. 
 The previous chapters consider the determinants of endowment 
spending rates.  Chapter 2 highlights the difficulty and importance of 
determining spending policies that achieves two contrasting objectives: 
providing relatively constant income for expenditure and maintaining the 
purchasing power of endowment funds.  Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 consider 
the endowment spending rate at two subsets of the 136 American colleges 
and universities with endowments greater than $500 million as of June 30, 
2007.  With ordinary least squares regressions, I estimate the determinants of 
the spending rate reported to NACUBO in Chapter 3 and the determinants 
of the spending rate reported to NACUBO and to the Senate Finance 
Committee in Chapter 4.  For each analysis, the model is estimated twice: 
once with the annual return of the Standard & Poor’s 500 and once with 
time dichotomous variables. 
The results of Chapter 3 yield the following conclusions.  Private 
institutions spent 0.35 percentage points more than public institutions over 
this time period, all else equal.  For every additional $100,000 in annual 
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giving per full-time equivalent, the spending rate increased by 1.49 
percentage points, suggesting that gifts did not fully support the cost of the 
activity for which the gift was allocated.  The spending rate increased by 0.11 
percentage points when the share of expenditures for research increased by 
10 percentage points, suggesting that research grants did not fully support 
the cost of the research for which the grant was earmarked.  The spending 
rate increased by 0.06 percentage points when the tuition discount rate 
increased by 10 percentage points, suggesting that endowment distributions 
supported institutional grant aid.  For every additional $1,000 in Pell grant 
awards per full-time equivalent, the spending rate increased by 0.36 
percentage points, suggesting that Pell grant awards did not fully support the 
cost of educating students from low-income families relative to students 
from high-income families.  As expected, the spending rate decreased by 
0.10 percentage points for every additional $100,000 of endowment market 
value per full-time equivalent.  The results also provide evidence that 
spending rules affected spending rates substantially; colleges and universities 
maximized their spending rate by increasing the prior year’s spending by 
inflation and minimized their spending rate by deciding on an appropriate 
rate each year.  These results largely remain the same for private institutions 
and for single campus institutions with only one or two variations: the Pell 
grant award becomes insignificant in both regressions and the “other” 
spending rule becomes significant in the regression with private institutions 
only.  However, these results vary considerably for public institutions and 
for main campus institutions; for the few variables that remain significant, 
many of the coefficients reverse in sign. 
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 Chapter 4 attempts to verify these results.  The results are 
inconclusive because the effects of certain variables differ between the 
spending rates reported to NACUBO and the spending rates reported to the 
Senate Finance Committee.  Such variables include the share of expenditures 
for research, the tuition discount rate, the average incoming freshman SAT I 
score, the first spending rule of spending a percentage of a moving 3-year 
average, and the fifth spending rule of increasing the prior year’s spending by 
a certain percentage.  The results for the Pell grant award and for the 
spending rule of deciding an appropriate rate each year raise concerns for 
private institutions and for single campus institutions; the results for the 
annual giving and the spending rule of spending a percentage of a moving 
average other than 3-year or 12-quarter raise additional concerns for single 
campus institutions. 
B.  Future Research 
The results in Chapter 3 primarily reflected private institutions; over 
sixty-five percent of the sample consisted of private institutions.  With only 
44 public institutions, the results for public institutions are based on a small 
sample size.  However, the results from Chapter 3 suggest that the effects of 
the variables in these analyses vary between public and private institutions.  I 
would recommend further research with a larger sample of public 
institutions to verify the results of these analyses. 
Additionally, the results in Chapter 4 suggest that the effects of the 
variables vary between the spending rates reported to NACUBO and the 
spending rates reported to the Senate Finance Committee, even when the 
spending rates are calculated identically.  I have no explanation for this 
variation, but I would recommend further communication with NACUBO 
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and with the appropriate colleges and universities to identify explanations for 
the divergence. 
Finally, the results in these analyses do not reflect the extreme 
declines in endowment market values during the late quarters of 2008 and 
the early quarters of 2009.  As Williamson comments during the mid-1970s, 
“After two decades of relative prosperity, colleges and universities are now 
facing critical financial problems. . . . it is clear that the premises and policies 
appropriate in an era of rapid growth are inappropriate for an era of 
slowdown and uncertainty.”27  While his comments were based on the 
market declines of the early 1970s, his observations remain true after the 
extreme market declines of the late 2000s.  Massy emphasizes the problem: 
“While the tension between the need to maintain or add to capital and the 
desire to spend for current purposes is difficult enough to manage even in 
normal times, the problem is exacerbated when an institution faces financial 
difficulties.”28  Because many payout policies are based on a moving average 
of market values, the stock market crash will continue to affect the 
endowment payout rates at colleges and universities for the next three to five 
years.  Once the necessary data is available, future research on the topic of 
endowment payout rates may yield substantially different conclusions than 
the conclusions presented here for the period from 1996 to 2006. 
                                                 
27 Williamson (1975), p. 22. 
28 Massy (1996), p. 89. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1:  Alphabetical List of Institutions 
 
Institution Name Control Campus 
Amherst College Private Single 
Baylor University Private Single 
Berry College Private Single 
Boston College Private Single 
Boston University Private Single 
Bowdoin College Private Single 
Brandeis University Private Single 
Brown University Private Single 
Bryn Mawr College Private Single 
Bucknell University Private Single 
California Institute of Technology Private Single 
Carleton College Private Single 
Carnegie Mellon University Private Single 
Case Western Reserve University Private Single 
Colby College Private Single 
Colgate University Private Single 
College of the Holy Cross Private Single 
College of William and Mary Public Single 
Colorado College Private Single 
Columbia University in the City of New York Private Single 
Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art Private Single 
Cornell University Private Single 
Dartmouth College Private Single 
Denison University Private Single 
DePauw University Private Single 
Drexel University Private Single 
Duke University Private Single 
Emory University Private Single 
Florida State University Public Single 
Furman University Private Single 
George Washington University Private Single 
Georgetown University Private Single 
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus Public Main 
Grinnell College Private Single 
Hamilton College Private Single 
Harvard University Private Single 
Haverford College Private Single 
Howard University Private Single 
Indiana University-Bloomington Public Main 
Iowa State University Public Single 
Lehigh University Private Single 
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Table A1 (Continued) 
 
Institution Name Control Campus 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Public Main 
Macalester College Private Single 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Private Single 
Michigan State University Public Single 
Middlebury College Private Single 
Mount Holyoke College Private Single 
New York University Private Single 
North Carolina State University at Raleigh Public Single 
Northeastern University Private Single 
Northwestern University Private Single 
Oberlin College Private Single 
Ohio State University-Main Campus Public Main 
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus Public Main 
Pepperdine University Private Single 
Pomona College Private Single 
Princeton University Private Single 
Purdue University-Main Campus Public Main 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Private Single 
Rice University Private Single 
Rochester Institute of Technology Private Single 
Saint Louis University-Main Campus Private Main 
Santa Clara University Private Single 
Smith College Private Single 
Southern Methodist University Private Single 
Stanford University Private Single 
Swarthmore College Private Single 
Syracuse University Private Single 
Texas A & M University Public Main 
Texas Christian University Private Single 
Texas Tech University Public Single 
The University of Alabama Public Main 
The University of Tennessee Public Main 
The University of Texas at Austin Public Main 
Thomas Jefferson University Private Single 
Trinity University Private Single 
Tufts University Private Single 
Tulane University of Louisiana Private Single 
University of Arizona Public Single 
University of Arkansas Main Campus Public Main 
University of California-Berkeley Public Single 
University of California-Los Angeles Public Single 
University of Chicago Private Single 
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus Public Main 
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Table A1 (Continued) 
 
Institution Name Control Campus 
University of Colorado at Boulder Public Main 
University of Delaware Public Single 
University of Florida Public Single 
University of Georgia Public Single 
University of Houston Public Main 
University of Iowa Public Single 
University of Kansas Main Campus Public Main 
University of Kentucky Public Single 
University of Louisville Public Single 
University of Maryland-College Park Public Main 
University of Miami Private Single 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor Public Main 
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities Public Main 
University of Missouri-Columbia Public Main 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln Public Main 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Public Single 
University of Notre Dame Private Single 
University of Oklahoma Norman Campus Public Main 
University of Pennsylvania Private Single 
University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus Public Main 
University of Richmond Private Single 
University of Rochester Private Single 
University of Southern California Private Single 
University of Tulsa Private Single 
University of Utah Public Single 
University of Virginia-Main Campus Public Main 
University of Washington-Seattle Campus Public Main 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Public Single 
Vanderbilt University Private Single 
Vassar College Private Single 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Public Single 
Wake Forest University Private Single 
Washington and Lee University Private Single 
Washington State University Public Single 
Washington University in St Louis Private Single 
Wellesley College Private Single 
Wesleyan University Private Single 
Williams College Private Single 
Yale University Private Single 
Yeshiva University Private Single 
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APPENDIX B 
 The original dataset for the analyses in Chapter 3 contained 131 of the 
136 American colleges and universities with endowments greater than $500 
million as of June 30, 2007.  Four of the excluded endowments lacked 
associated institutional characteristics; one lacked required spending rates.29  
For the original dataset of 131 institutions, 87 were private and 106 were 
single campus institutions.  The frequencies of institutions and observations 
are further specified in Tables B1 and B2, respectively. 
 
Table B1:  Number of Institutions 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 86 20 106 
Main Campus 1 24 25 
Total 87 44 131 
  
Table B2:  Number of Observations 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 893 210 1103 
Main Campus 11 243 254 
Total 904 453 1357 
 
The summary statistics for the original dataset are reported in Table B3.  The 
maximum values for the share of total expenditures for research and for the 
tuition discount rate are 230 and 1.06, respectively.  Because both of these  
                                                 
29 The endowments lacking institutional characteristics are for the Principia Corporation, the State 
University of New York (SUNY) system and the University of Buffalo, Rutgers State University of New 
Jersey, and Thomas Jefferson University.  The one endowment lacking spending rates is for Boston 
College. 
 
 Table B3:  Summary Statistics for Original Dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
spendrate 1357 4.7 0.9060 2.3 4.6 9.0 
endow 1255 2.84 8.2664 0.07 1.15 116.95 
giving 950 0.15 0.4131 0.01 0.08 5.83 
research_share 887 0.53 7.9038 0.00 0.12 230.00 
tuition_discount 1335 0.28 0.1366 0.01 0.27 1.06 
pell 1268 0.34 0.2328 0.00 0.31 2.51 
SAT50 1114 12.72 1.1010 10.10 12.75 15.25 
SP500 1357 0.09 0.1731 -0.23 0.14 0.31 
 
 
Table B4:  Summary Statistics for Edited Dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
spendrate 1357 4.7 0.9060 2.3 4.6 9.0 
endow 1255 2.84 8.2664 0.07 1.15 116.95 
giving 950 0.15 0.4131 0.01 0.08 5.83 
research_share 879 0.13 0.1193 0.00 0.12 0.67 
tuition_discount 1324 0.28 0.1216 0.01 0.27 0.96 
pell 1268 0.34 0.2328 0.00 0.31 2.51 
SAT50 1114 12.72 1.1010 10.10 12.75 15.25 
SP500 1357 0.09 0.1731 -0.23 0.14 0.31 
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variables are expressed as a proportion, these values are presumed to be 
errors: an institution’s research expenditures cannot be greater than an 
institution’s total expenditures, and the amount of a scholarship or 
fellowship allocated to the institution cannot be greater than the amount of 
the scholarship or fellowship itself.  To adjust for these errors, I treat the 
share of total expenditures for research as a missing variable for the seven 
observations from the two institutions where the reported shares are 
presumed to be errors.  Additionally, the six observations where the reported 
tuition discount rates are presumed to be errors are from the same 
institution; thus, I treat the tuition discount rate as a missing variable for all 
eleven observations from this college.   
The summary statistics for the edited dataset are reported in Table B4.  
The maximums for the endowment market value per full-time equivalent, 
the total annual giving per full-time equivalent, and the Pell grant award per 
full-time equivalent are very large compared to the median.  All ten of the 
ten highest observations of endowment market value per full-time equivalent 
are reported by Rockefeller University.  Of the ten highest observations of 
total giving per full-time equivalent, eight observations are reported by 
Rockefeller University and two are reported by Baylor College of Medicine.  
All ten of the ten highest observations of Pell grant award per full-time 
equivalent are reported by Berea College.  The data illustrate that Rockefeller 
University and Baylor College of Medicine are distinctly different from the 
average institution in the sample, and indeed, both of these institutions are 
stand-alone medical schools or medical schools unaffiliated with a 
comprehensive liberal arts undergraduate program.  I remove all such 
institutions from the sample: Rockefeller University, Baylor College of 
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Medicine, and the Medical College of Wisconsin.  I also remove another 
institution lacking a comprehensive liberal arts undergraduate program: 
Princeton Theological Seminary.  Similar to medical schools, Princeton 
Theological seminary offers only graduate degrees from one discipline.  
Finally, I remove Berea College from the sample.  Berea College is a private 
liberal arts college where all students meet a certain definition of need as 
determined by the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).  
Additionally, all students receive full tuition scholarships, and all students 
work at least ten hours per week at on campus jobs.  After removing these 
institutions, the resulting edited and reduced dataset is described and 
analyzed in Chapter 3.   
 Columns (1) and (2) of Table B5 report the results of the regressions 
with the original dataset; columns (3) and (4) report the results of the 
regressions with the edited data; and columns (5) and (6) report the results of 
the regressions with the edited and reduced data.30  The regressions with the 
annual return of the Standard & Poor’s 500 are reported in columns (1), (3), 
and (5); the regressions with time dichotomous variables are reported in 
columns (2), (4), and (6).  Comparing columns (2), (4), and (6), we see that 
the coefficients on the control of the institution, the endowment market 
value, the total annual giving, the share of expenditures for research, the 
tuition discount, and the Pell grant awards are greatest in absolute value for 
the edited and reduced dataset.  The coefficient on the Pell grant awards 
becomes significant for the edited and reduced dataset, while the coefficient 
on SAT score becomes insignificant.  Overall, the significance of the time  
                                                 
30 The results in columns (5) and (6) are the same as the results for all institutions, first reported in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 6. 
 
Table B5:  Results for Original and Edited Data 
 
                   Original Data                 Edited Data                  Edited and Reduced Data 
      (1)       (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
private  0.07010  0.17282**  0.14002*  0.21992***  0.25974***  0.35380*** 
 (0.07284) (0.07277) (0.07344) (0.07333) (0.07773) (0.07811) 
       
endow -0.02648*** -0.02847*** -0.02584*** -0.02738*** -0.10610*** -0.09970*** 
 (0.00721) (0.00680) (0.00715) (0.00676) (0.01456) (0.01379) 
       
giving  0.37114**  0.40089***  0.32628**  0.37353***  1.24775***  1.48872*** 
 (0.15166) (0.14293) (0.15128) (0.14325) (0.38111) (0.36069) 
       
research_share  0.00670*  0.00865**  1.29722***  0.92323***  1.53468***  1.10684*** 
 (0.00378) (0.00358) (0.28797) (0.27469) (0.30710) (0.29325) 
       
tuition_discount  0.30770  0.21956  0.57157**  0.44065*  0.75869***  0.63042** 
 (0.24325) (0.22984) (0.24292) (0.23069) (0.27005) (0.25578) 
       
pell  0.12285 -0.01798  0.23052  0.00885  0.60968***  0.36378** 
 (0.13671) (0.13020) (0.14093) (0.13583) (0.18893) (0.18047) 
       
SAT50 -0.05647* -0.07026** -0.08672*** -0.09274*** -0.02375 -0.04852 
 (0.03234) (0.03056) (0.03222) (0.03053) (0.03592) (0.03416) 
       
rule1 -0.16070** -0.17732** -0.15911** -0.17139** -0.20035** -0.20813*** 
 (0.08049) (0.07586) (0.07993) (0.07568) (0.07922) (0.07476) 
       
rule3 -0.19121** -0.21026*** -0.18815** -0.20464*** -0.21262*** -0.21721*** 
 (0.08276) (0.07796) (0.08209) (0.07768) (0.08145) (0.07686) 
       
rule5 -0.40229*** -0.43395*** -0.40624*** -0.43206*** -0.36191*** -0.39786*** 
 (0.11654) (0.10991) (0.11539) (0.10927) (0.11540) (0.10893) 
       
rule7 -0.00549  0.00216  0.05247  0.04617  0.15440  0.14359 
 (0.10568) (0.09962) (0.10608) (0.10040) (0.10563) (0.09971) 
       
rule8  0.56391**  0.53719**  0.60794**  0.56151**  0.62397**  0.59354** 
 (0.27588) (0.25964) (0.27479) (0.25978) (0.26999) (0.25478) 
       
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 99%, ** denotes coefficient is significant at 95%, * denotes coefficient is significant at 90% 
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Table B5 (Continued) 
 
rule9 -0.07288 -0.08508 -0.05915 -0.07288 -0.04824 -0.05049 
 (0.06889) (0.06490) (0.06843) (0.06477) (0.06855) (0.06477) 
       
SP500  0.33874**   0.36178**   0.30835**  
 (0.14945)  (0.14850)  (0.14779)  
       
t97  -0.23396*  -0.16419  -0.08214 
  (0.12424)  (0.12347)  (0.12317) 
       
t98  -0.42776***  -0.39702***  -0.30162** 
  (0.13384)  (0.13334)  (0.13276) 
       
t99  -0.51752***  -0.48732***  -0.37661*** 
  (0.13341)  (0.13305)  (0.13242) 
       
t00  -0.41791***  -0.39386***  -0.27142** 
  (0.13414)  (0.13387)  (0.13350) 
       
t01  -0.44549***  -0.42635***  -0.30389** 
  (0.14016)  (0.14000)  (0.13959) 
       
t02   0.12176   0.13711   0.27027* 
  (0.15124)  (0.15157)  (0.15165) 
       
t03   0.49432***   0.50036***   0.62952*** 
  (0.15487)  (0.15533)  (0.15587) 
       
t04   0.35023**   0.35884**   0.51191*** 
  (0.15529)  (0.15574)  (0.15650) 
       
t05  -0.06985  -0.06431   0.09908 
  (0.15507)  (0.15554)  (0.15656) 
       
t06  -0.29993*  -0.31209**  -0.29082* 
  (0.15709)  (0.15758)  (0.16354) 
       
n  1357  1357  1357  1357  1312  1312 
Adj R-Square  0.0510  0.1602  0.0621  0.1628  0.1010  0.2014 
Year Dummy  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
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dichotomous variables remains the same across datasets, but the coefficients 
on the time variables from 1997-2001 become closer to zero for the edited 
and reduced dataset while the coefficients on the time variables from 2002-
2005 become farther from zero. 
APPENDIX C 
Table C1:  Sources and Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
spendrate Spending rate reported to NACUBO NACUBO 
private A dummy variable for private institutions Delta Cost Project 
endow 
Market value of endowment assets per full-time equivalent in hundreds of         
thousands of dollars 
Council for Aid to Education 
giving 
Amount received through gifts per full-time equivalent in hundreds of  
    thousands of dollars 
Council for Aid to Education 
research_share Proportion of total expenditures allocated to research Delta Cost Project 
tuition_discount Proportion of total tuition revenue discounted by institutional grants Delta Cost Project 
pell Pell grant award per full-time equivalent in thousands of dollars Delta Cost Project 
SAT50 Average of 25th and 75th percentile SAT score in hundreds of points College Board 
rule1 A dummy variable for spending rule 1 NACUBO 
rule3 A dummy variable for spending rule 3 NACUBO 
rule4 A dummy variable for spending rule 4 NACUBO 
rule5 A dummy variable for spending rule 5 NACUBO 
rule6 A dummy variable for spending rule 6 NACUBO 
rule7 A dummy variable for spending rule 7 NACUBO 
SP500 Annual change in value of the Standard & Poor's 500 Yahoo! Finance 
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APPENDIX D 
Table D1:  Coefficient Matrix 
 private endow giving research tuition pell SAT50 rule1 rule3 rule4 rule5 rule6 rule7 
endow 0.46030 1.00000            
 <.0001             
              
giving 0.31915 0.57861 1.00000           
 <.0001 <.0001            
              
research 0.08851 0.10909 0.19123 1.00000          
 0.0013 <.0001 <.0001           
              
tuition 0.45690 0.45837 0.35251 0.03724 1.00000         
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1776          
              
pell -0.44411 -0.30686 -0.21267 -0.14147 -0.04441 1.00000        
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1079         
              
SAT50 0.22483 0.17249 0.09652 0.24322 0.10092 -0.15406 1.00000       
 <.0001 <.0001 0.0005 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001        
              
rule1 -0.15444 -0.19139 -0.07294 0.06015 -0.14588 0.08371 -0.07501 1.00000      
 <.0001 <.0001 0.0082 0.0294 <.0001 0.0024 0.0066       
              
rule3 0.02250 -0.10478 -0.11500 -0.03360 0.05188 0.02495 0.01851 -0.18952 1.00000     
 0.4154 .0001 <.0001 0.2239 0.0603 0.3665 0.5029 <.0001      
              
rule4 0.03128 0.13469 0.07321 0.03633 -0.06716 -0.03698 0.03098 -0.11360 -0.10401   1.00000    
 0.2576 <.0001 0.0080 0.1885 0.0150 0.1807 0.2621 <.0001 0.0002     
              
rule5 0.20746 0.27334 0.10035 -0.08531 0.15262 -0.04782 0.07782 -0.12998 -0.11901 -0.07133 1.00000   
 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 0.0020 <.0001 0.0834 0.0048 <.0001 <.0001 0.0097    
              
rule6 -0.12662 -0.04987 -0.00572 -0.02087 -0.06962 -0.04470 0.01330 -0.04183 -0.03830 -0.02296 -0.02627 1.00000  
 <.0001 0.0709 0.8360 0.4501 0.0117 0.1056 0.6302 0.1299 0.1656 0.4060 0.3417   
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Table D1 (Continued) 
 private endow giving research tuition pell SAT50 rule1 rule3 rule4 rule5 rule6 rule7 
rule7 0.01732 0.03989 0.05960 0.05685 -0.09709 -0.11113 0.04145 -0.31383 -0.28734 -0.17224 -0.19706 -0.06343 1.00000 
 0.5307 0.1487 0.0309 0.0395 0.0004 <.0001 0.1335 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0216  
              
SP500 0.01042 -0.04989 -0.18322 -0.11620 -0.04248 -0.03374 -0.08539 -0.01597 0.00290 0.00620 0.00709 0.00228 0.00796 
 0.7060 0.0709 <.0001 <.0001 0.1241 0.2220 0.0020 0.5632 0.9164 0.8225 0.7974 0.9341 0.7732 
              
t97 0.00764 -0.04475 -0.23162 -0.05048 -0.05178 -0.07347 0.06713 -0.01479 0.00453 0.00566 0.00647 0.00208 0.00711 
 0.7823 0.1052 <.0001 0.0676 0.0608 0.0078 0.0150 0.5924 0.8698 0.8378 0.8148 0.9399 0.7971    
              
t98 0.00401 -0.02418 -0.01932 -0.03147 -0.05010 -0.04901 0.07853 -0.01231 -0.00003 0.00288 0.00329 0.00106 0.00532 
 0.8848 0.3815 0.4845 0.2547 0.0697 0.0760 0.0044 0.6559 0.9990 0.9171 0.9052 0.9694 0.8473 
              
t99 -0.00315 0.00039 0.00630 -0.04449 -0.03786 0.01381 0.08453 0.00295 -0.00554 -0.00048 -0.00055 -0.00018 -0.00390 
 0.9091   0.9887    0.8197     0.1072    0.1705 0.6171    0.0022    0.9150 0.8411 0.9861 0.9841 0.9949 0.8878 
              
t00 -0.00677 0.02926 0.02453 -0.04067 -0.01964 -0.06063 0.06905 0.00174 0.00080 -0.00114 -0.00130 -0.00042 -0.00570 
 0.8065    0.2895    0.3747     0.1409    0.4772    0.0281    0.0124    0.9497 0.9768 0.9672 0.9625 0.9879 0.8366 
              
t01 -0.00292   0.01825   0.07528 -0.03657 -0.00716 -0.02383 0.07088 0.00629 -0.00138 -0.00243 -0.00278 -0.00090 -0.00367 
 0.9158 0.5090 0.0064 0.1855 0.7955 0.3884 0.0102 0.8200 0.9601 0.9298 0.9197 0.9197 0.8943 
              
t02 -0.00292   -0.00588   0.06668    0.14400   0.01939   0.05032   0.08040   0.00629 -0.00138 -0.00243 -0.00278 -0.00090 -0.00367 
 0.9158    0.8315 0.0157 <.0001 0.4828 0.0685    0.0036    0.8200 0.9601 0.9298 0.9197 0.9197 0.8943 
              
t03 -0.00292 -0.01314 0.06014 0.16666 0.03522 0.08703   0.01797   0.00629 -0.00138 -0.00243 -0.00278 -0.00090 -0.00367 
 0.9158    0.6345 0.0294 <.0001 0.2023 0.0016 0.5155 0.8200 0.9601 0.9298 0.9197 0.9197 0.8943 
              
t04 -0.00292   0.01146   0.05484    0.17797   0.04917   0.07102   0.11032   0.00629 -0.00138 -0.00243 -0.00278 -0.00090 0.00192 
 0.9158 0.6783 0.0470 <.0001 0.0750 0.0101    <.0001    0.8200 0.9601 0.9298 0.9197 0.9197 0.9445 
              
t05 -0.00292 0.03207 0.08013 0.17709 0.05367 0.05917   0.11407   0.00629 -0.00138 -0.00243 -0.00278 -0.00090 0.00192 
 0.9158 0.2456 0.0037 <.0001 0.0520 0.0321    <.0001    0.8200 0.9601 0.9298 0.9197 0.9197 0.9445 
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Table D1 (Continued) 
 private endow giving research tuition pell SAT50 rule1 rule3 rule4 rule5 rule6 rule7 
t06 -0.00292 0.05377 0.08992 -0.24923 0.06463 0.01136 -0.73232 0.00629 -0.00138 -0.00243 -0.00278 -0.00090 0.00192 
 0.9158 0.0515 0.0011 <.0001 0.0192 0.6810 <.0001    0.8200 0.9601 0.9298 0.9197 0.9197 0.9445 
              
 SP500 t97 t98 t99 t00 t01 t02 t03 t04 t05 t06   
t97 0.38756 1.00000            
 <.0001             
              
t98 0.31749 -0.09423 1.00000           
 <.0001 0.0006            
              
t99 0.19417 -0.09646 -0.09835 1.00000          
 <.0001 0.0005 0.0004           
              
t00 -0.35081 -0.09690 -0.09880 -0.10113 1.00000         
 <.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002          
              
t01 -0.40790 -0.09778 -0.09969 -0.10205 -0.10252 1.00000        
 <.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002         
              
t02 -0.59958 -0.09778 -0.09969 -0.10205 -0.10205 -0.10345 1.00000       
 <.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002        
              
t03 0.32410 -0.09778 -0.09969 -0.10205 -0.10205 -0.10345 -0.10345 1.00000      
 <.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002       
              
t04 0.00126 -0.09778 -0.09969 -0.10205 -0.10205 -0.10345 -0.10345 -0.10345 1.00000     
 0.9636 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002      
              
t05 -0.11001 -0.09778 -0.09969 -0.10205 -0.10205 -0.10345 -0.10345 -0.10345 -0.10345 1.00000    
 <.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002     
              
t06 0.08716 -0.09778 -0.09969 -0.10205 -0.10205 -0.10345 -0.10345 -0.10345 -0.10345 -0.10345 1.00000   
 0.0016 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002    
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APPENDIX E 
Table E1:  Alphabetical List of Institutions 
 
Institution Name Control Campus 
Amherst College Private Single 
Brown University Private Single 
Columbia University in the City of New York Private Single 
Cornell University Private Single 
Dartmouth College Private Single 
Duke University Private Single 
Georgetown University Private Single 
Grinnell College Private Single 
Harvard University Private Single 
Indiana University-Bloomington Public Main 
Iowa State University Public Single 
Lehigh University Private Single 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Private Single 
Michigan State University Public Single 
New York University Private Single 
Northwestern University Private Single 
Ohio State University-Main Campus Public Main 
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus Public Main 
Pomona College Private Single 
Princeton University Private Single 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Private Single 
Rice University Private Single 
Smith College Private Single 
Stanford University Private Single 
Syracuse University Private Single 
The University of Texas at Austin Public Main 
Tufts University Private Single 
University of California-Berkeley Public Single 
University of Chicago Private Single 
University of Iowa Public Single 
University of Kansas Main Campus Public Main 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor Public Main 
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities Public Main 
University of Notre Dame Private Single 
University of Pennsylvania Private Single 
University of Rochester Private Single 
University of Virginia-Main Campus Public Main 
University of Washington-Seattle Campus Public Main 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Public Single 
Wellesley College Private Single 
Yale University Private Single 
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APPENDIX F 
The original dataset for the analyses in Chapter 4 contained all 42 of 
the 42 colleges and universities that provided complete and accessible 
responses to the public as well as to the Senate Finance Committee.  For the 
original dataset of 42 institutions, 28 were private and 33 were single campus 
institutions.  The frequencies of institutions and observations are further 
specified in Tables F1 and F2, respectively. 
 
Table F1:  Number of Institutions 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 28 5 33 
Main Campus 0       9 9 
Total 28 14 42 
 
Table F2:  Number of Observations 
 Private Public Total 
Single Campus 248 45 293 
Main Campus 0 82 82 
Total 248 127 375 
 
 The summary statistics for the original dataset are provided in Table 
F3.  As in Appendix B, the maximum values for the share of total 
expenditures for research and the tuition discount rate exceed one.  For the 
two observations from the one institution where the share of total 
expenditures for research are presumed to be errors, I report the share of 
total expenditures for research as missing observations.  Similarly, for the 
Table F3:  Summary Statistics for Original Dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
spendrate 365 4.5 0.7829 2.4 4.5 8.3 
spendrate_ave 375 4.2 1.0958 1.4 4.2 10.7 
spendrate_beg 375 4.4 1.1459 1.5 4.4 12.8 
endow 372 3.18 3.6359 0.11 1.90 19.26 
giving 321 0.14 0.0963 0.01 0.11 0.59 
research_share 270 0.37 2.4342 0.01 0.16 31.13 
tuition_discount 374 0.30 0.1540 0.05 0.27 1.06 
pell 357 0.36 0.3429 0.04 0.31 2.51 
SAT50 313 13.21 1.1088 10.87 13.30 15.00 
SP500 375 0.06 0.1702 -0.23 0.09 0.31 
 
Table F4:  Summary Statistics for Edited Dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
spendrate 365 4.5 0.7829 2.4 4.5 8.3 
spendrate_ave 375 4.2 1.0958 1.4 4.2 10.7 
spendrate_beg 375 4.4 1.1459 1.5 4.4 12.8 
endow 372 3.18 3.6359 0.11 1.90 19.26 
giving 321 0.14 0.0963 0.01 0.11 0.59 
research_share 268 0.16 0.0928 0.01 0.16 0.48 
tuition_discount 365 0.28 0.1115 0.05 0.27 0.60 
pell 357 0.36 0.3429 0.04 0.31 2.51 
SAT50 313 13.21 1.1088 10.87 13.30 15.00 
SP500 375 0.06 0.1702 -0.23 0.09 0.31 
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five observations from one institution where the tuition discount rates are 
presumed to be errors, I treat the tuition discount rate for all observations 
from this institution as missing.   
The summary statistics for the edited dataset are reported in Table F4.  
Again, the summary statistics for the Pell grant award per full-time 
equivalent is skewed by Berea College.  Given the uniqueness of this 
institution as discussed in Appendix B, I remove Berea College from the 
analyses in this section.  After removing this institution, the resulting edited 
and reduced dataset is described and analyzed in Chapter 4. 
 
APPENDIX G 
Table G1:  Sources and Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
spendrate Spending rate reported to NACUBO NACUBO 
aspendrate Calculated spending rate based on the average of beginning & ending market values  Senate Finance Committee 
bspendrate Calculated spending rate based on the beginning endowment market value Senate Finance Committee 
private A dummy variable for private institutions Delta Cost Project 
endow 
Market value of endowment assets per full-time equivalent in hundreds of  
    thousands of dollars 
Council for Aid to 
Education 
giving 
Amount received through gifts per full-time equivalent in hundreds of  
thousands of dollars 
Council for Aid to 
Education 
research_share Proportion of total expenditures allocated to research Delta Cost Project 
tuition_discount Proportion of total tuition revenue discounted by institutional grants Delta Cost Project 
pell Pell grant award per full-time equivalent in thousands of dollars Delta Cost Project 
SAT50 Average of 25th and 75th percentile SAT score in hundreds of points College Board 
rule1 A dummy variable for spending rule 1 NACUBO 
rule3 A dummy variable for spending rule 3 NACUBO 
rule4 A dummy variable for spending rule 4 NACUBO 
rule5 A dummy variable for spending rule 5 NACUBO 
rule6 A dummy variable for spending rule 6 NACUBO 
rule7 A dummy variable for spending rule 7 NACUBO 
SP500 Annual change in value of the Standard & Poor's 500 Yahoo! Finance 
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APPENDIX H 
Table H1:  Coefficient Matrix 
 private endow giving research tuition pell SAT50 rule1 rule3 rule4 rule5 rule7 
endow 0.53073 1.00000           
 <.0001            
             
giving 0.50077 0.62112 1.00000          
 <.0001 <.0001           
             
research 0.26968 0.19015 0.25768    1.00000         
 0.0013 0.0002 <.0001          
             
tuition 0.57294 0.69767 0.49804 0.10018 1.00000        
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0552         
             
pell -0.43417 -0.35003 -0.32486 -0.25974 -0.17861 1.00000       
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0006        
             
SAT50 0.17719 0.11316 0.07029 0.39714 0.07506 -0.06098 1.00000      
 0.0006 0.0302 0.1790 <.0001 0.1513 0.2439       
             
rule1 0.20087 -0.03176 0.16093 0.00336 0.12888 -0.20814 0.04335 1.00000     
 0.0001 0.5442 0.0020 0.9489 0.0135 <.0001 0.4077      
             
rule3 -0.14111 -0.12147 -0.17811 -0.13402 -0.12329 0.06773 0.00533 -0.11344 1.00000    
 0.0068 0.0199 0.0006 0.0102 0.0181 0.1955 0.9189 0.0298     
             
rule4 0.06659 0.08679 0.08745 0.03674 -0.06118 0.14699 -0.01604 -0.09106 -0.13549 1.00000   
 0.2031 0.0969 0.0944 0.4829 0.2423 0.0048 0.7595 0.0815 0.0094    
             
rule5 0.20499 0.34288 0.18152 -0.05616 0.33849 0.07270 0.05703 -0.07781 -0.11578 -0.09294 1.00000  
 <.0001 <.0001 0.0005 0.2832 <.0001 0.1646 0.2758 0.1368 0.0266 0.0754   
             
rule7 0.01260 -0.00842 0.15249 0.22443 -0.11543 -0.17715 0.04609 -0.21187 -0.31524 -0.25305 -0.21622 1.00000 
 0.8098 0.8724 0.0034 <.0001 0.0270 0.0007 0.3786 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
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Table H1 (Continued) 
 private endow giving research tuition pell SAT50 rule1 rule3 rule4 rule5 rule7 
SP500 -0.01105 -0.02394 -0.07432 -0.08053 -0.02485 0.02980 -0.15824 -0.01212 -0.00812 0.00115 0.00098 0.01631 
 0.8330 0.6476 0.1553 0.1236 0.6351 0.5693 0.0024 0.8170 0.8768 0.9825 0.9851 0.7555 
             
t97 0.00243 -0.02309 -0.10310 0.03665 -0.03536 -0.07043 0.03707 -0.02507 -0.03730 -0.02994 -0.02558 0.11832 
 0.9630 0.6593 0.0484 0.4839 0.4995 0.1782 0.4790 0.6322 0.4763 0.5675 0.6252 0.0234 
             
t98 -0.02276 -0.04455 -0.13162 -0.08363 -0.07021 -0.04960 0.10903 -0.02191 -0.00884 0.01127 0.00963 0.00541 
 0.6639 0.3948 0.0116 0.1097 0.1796 0.3433 0.0368 0.6756 0.8660 0.8296 0.8541 0.9177 
             
t99 -0.00290 -0.03923 -0.06550   -0.07481 -0.06555 -0.00074 0.11962 0.00566 0.00556 0.00224 0.00192 -0.01490 
 0.9558 0.4537 0.2106 0.1526 0.2102 0.9888 0.0219 0.9139 0.9155 0.9658 0.9708 0.7761 
             
t00 0.00342 0.00240 -0.03594 -0.05423 -0.02971 -0.10766 0.10172 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.9634   0.4924 0.3001 0.5704 0.0393 0.0515 0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
             
t01 0.00342 0.00952 0.05238 -0.06373 -0.00975 -0.04173 0.07983 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.8558 0.3170 0.2232 0.8523 0.4255 0.1269 0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
             
t02 0.00342 -0.01480 0.01735 0.14743 0.00953 0.03458 0.10622 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.7774 0.7405 0.0047 0.8556 0.5090 0.0420 0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
             
t03 0.00342 -0.01901 0.02737 0.16184 0.01128 0.07960 -0.01028 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.7167 0.6012 0.0019 0.8295 0.1280 0.8443 0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
             
t04 0.00342 0.00592 0.01572 0.17629 0.05031 0.07348 0.13953 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.9101 0.7641 0.0007 0.3365 0.1601 0.0074 0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
             
t05 0.00342 0.03379 0.05325 0.17246 0.04060 0.04584 0.14410 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.5188 0.3089 0.0009 0.4381 0.3812 0.0057 0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
             
t06 0.00342 0.07018 0.08993 -0.39660 0.06980 -0.01584 -0.79425 0.00322 0.00194 -0.00063 -0.00054 -0.00346 
 0.9480 0.1798 0.0854 <.0001 0.1821 0.7624 <.0001    0.9511 0.9704 0.9903 0.9917 0.9473 
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Table H1 (Continued) 
 SP500 t97 t98 t99 t00 t01 t02 t03 t04 t05 t06  
t97 0.13530 1.00000           
 0.0095            
             
t98 0.41353 -0.03040 1.00000          
 <.0001 0.5616           
             
t99 0.28495 -0.03175 -0.11711 1.00000         
 <.0001 0.5443 0.0249          
             
t00 -0.33006 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 1.00000        
 <.0001 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174         
             
t01 -0.39064 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 -0.12577 1.00000       
 <.0001 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174 0.0159        
             
t02 -0.60605 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 -0.12577 -0.12577 1.00000      
 <.0001 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174 0.0159 0.0159       
             
t03 0.43196 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 1.00000     
 <.0001 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159      
             
t04 0.06916 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 1.00000    
 0.1862 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159     
             
t05 -0.05587 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 1.00000   
 0.2857 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159    
             
t06 0.16569 -0.03220 -0.11875 -0.12403 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 -0.12577 1.00000  
 0.0014 0.5387 0.0229 0.0174 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159   
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